Crisis in Pakistan: Introduction

Part 1 of a 6 part essay on the growing threat of the Taliban in Pakistan and how to combat it

Ever since the shocking, saddening events of September 11, 2001, U.S. policy has been dominated by an array of initiatives known collectively as the “war on terror.” Though enacted with good intentions, the “war on terror” has generated more controversy than it has palpable results. It has embroiled the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and has left it increasingly isolated in international affairs.[1] It has undermined the foundations not only of American ideals but of American law as well.[2] All the while, Islamic extremism has arguably gained in popularity, and the very groups that are responsible for the September 11th terrorist attacks – Al Qaeda and the Taliban – have eluded destruction and are more powerful than ever.

How ironic it would be if the most direct consequence of the “war on terror” was the overthrow of a government by Muslim extremists and the destabilization of a nuclear-armed country. With the Taliban gaining full control of the Swat Valley in Pakistan last February[3] and advancing to within 60 miles of Islamabad just a few months ago[4] – moving much faster and over a wider area than in any of their previous incursions – such a catastrophe seems to be looming just over the horizon.

Pakistan has long been the geopolitical thorn in the side of the “war on terror.” The South Asian Muslim nation had been the Taliban’s most valuable supporter[5] prior to the September 11th attacks, and after the NATO invasion of Afghanistan, the remnants of the Taliban were able to avoid total destruction by migrating across the porous Afghan-Pakistani border and finding refuge in the mountainous, loosely governed regions of Pakistan’s northwest.[6] Although the United States was able to coax an ambivalent Pakistan into supporting its “war on terror,” the Pakistani Army was unwilling and unable to launch a concerted offensive to eradicate the Taliban once and for all.[7] As a result, Taliban militants were able to regroup and begin their expansion inside Pakistan that now has brought them within 60 miles of Pakistan’s capital.

[1] http://www.icosgroup.net/modules/reports/chronic_failures_war_terror/exec_summary
[2] http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/26684res20060906.html
[3] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/16/AR2009021601063.html
[4] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/22/AR2009042200863.html
[5] http://www.cfr.org/publication/10551/
[6] http://www.cfr.org/publication/14905/troubled_afghanpakistani_border.html
[7] http://www.cfr.org/publication/14905/troubled_afghanpakistani_border.html

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Crisis in Pakistan: The Rise of the Taliban

Part 2 of a 6 part essay on the growing threat of the Taliban in Pakistan and how to combat it

Although the Taliban had no presence in Pakistan before 2001, the radical Muslim Pashtun group did have several advantages upon arriving in Pakistan that would make it easier for the group to reorganize and spread within the country. It had a much better knowledge of the mountainous terrain than did NATO forces or Pakistani forces and officials, most of who came from Punjab or Sindh, far from the northwest. It also had the support of local Pashtuns, who lived on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border. Such knowledge and support was crucial in enabling the Taliban to escape into Pakistan and find relative security and support upon arriving.[1]

After settling down and regrouping, the Taliban set about expanding ever deeper into Pakistan. With over a decade of experience in building grassroots support and in governing gained through their rise and time in power in Afghanistan and with nearly two decades of experience in guerilla warfare gained fighting the Soviets and other Afghans during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Afghan Civil War, respectively, Taliban militants were skilled at taking over a country from the bottom up.[2]

In addition to using their stringent religious doctrine to appeal to die-hard Muslims, members of the Taliban have been able to prey off growing popular dissatisfaction with the corruption and incompetence of local and national Pakistani officials, the inefficiency of domestic institutions like the judicial system, and the gap between the rich and the poor, among other things, by offering themselves and their law as suitable alternatives to the current structure of Pakistani government and society.

Although the Taliban’s rule seems iron-fisted and strict, it at least seems efficient and consistent with some sort of doctrine (albeit a radical one). By contrast, the Pakistani government seems inefficient and corrupt, and its primary purpose seems to be to serve the interests of those in power; the two most powerful politicians in Pakistan, President Asif Ali Zardari and Nawaz Sharif, as well as Zardari’s famous widow (and claim to fame) Benazir Bhutto, were all indicted on corruption charges at some point in their lives.[3] Considering that the two most powerful parties in Pakistan – the PPP and the PML-N – have been headed since their inception by the Bhuttos (from Sindh) and the Sharifs (from Punjab),[4] respectively, Pakistani elections seem more like instruments of dynastic rivalry than a mechanism of popular sovereignty.

The inefficient and biased local and national judiciary systems are just a couple of examples of Pakistan’s domestic institutions being hampered and distorted by the rampant favoritism and corruption in the Pakistani government. Indeed, most proponents of a Sharia Law system are not in favor of the Taliban’s extreme interpretation of Islam but rather view such Islam-based courts as a practical alternative to the current judicial mess.[5]

The same families that control the political parties control most of the wealth and land of Pakistan as well.[6] The Sharifs, for instance, were some of the first and are now some of the richest industrial magnates in Pakistan, owning the large Ittefaq conglomerate based in Lahore.[7] Most of the other Pakistanis live in poverty in the poor rural areas or the slums. The corrupt political system seems to perpetuate the dominance and wealth of the semi-aristocratic families at the expense of everyone else.[8]

The great many poor and dissatisfied people in Pakistan have provided fertile ground for Taliban recruitment and expansion for the past seven years, to the point that the Taliban now poses a serious challenge to the existence of the Pakistani state. The degree of Pakistani discontent and the ruthlessness with which the Taliban has exploited such dissatisfaction have been matched by Pakistan’s inability to definitively roll back or crush the Taliban at any stage of its expansion. The Pakistani Army, more concerned with India and unwilling to commit troops to a thorough counterinsurgency campaign, has only sporadically fought the Taliban.[9] Left with little muscle to resist the Taliban, local and national officials have had to resort to making truces with the Taliban in order avoid total capitulation.[10]

Such a cyclical process of Taliban aggression, brief Pakistani retaliation, and truce has been immensely frustrating for the United States, as it has undermined the true front line of the U.S. “war on terror.” Out of each cycle, the Taliban has emerged stronger, with more land, more recruits, and more confidence.

[1] http://www.cfr.org/publication/14905/troubled_afghanpakistani_border.html
[2] http://www.cfr.org/publication/10551/
[3] http://www.newstatesman.com/200206030017
[4] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/05/magazine/05zardari-t.html?_r=1&ref=magazine
[5] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/09/AR2009050902518.html
[6] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/world/asia/17pstan.html?pagewanted=1
[7] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/sharif.htm
[8] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/world/asia/17pstan.html?pagewanted=1
[9] http://spectator.org/archives/2009/05/12/the-pakistan-army-reluctant-wa
[10] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/16/AR2009021601063.html

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Crisis in Pakistan: Limitations of the United States in Pakistan and of the Pakistani Government

Part 3 of a 6 part essay on the growing threat of the Taliban in Pakistan and how to combat it

The events of the first half of 2009 seem to follow the pattern of the Taliban expansion cycle, with the Taliban transgression into Swat, the truce, and the subsequent Taliban incursion into Buner. But the swiftness and forcefulness of this latest Taliban offensive, as well as its proximity to the Pakistani capital, are troubling even by Pakistani standards. President Obama, to his credit, has acknowledged the gravity of the worsening situation in Pakistan and has realized that someone somewhere must do something to stop the advance of Taliban militants, lest they reach Islamabad by year’s end.

However, President Obama is also beginning to realize that the United States has very limited options with which to influence the situation in Pakistan, none of which have worked well lately. U.S. drone aircraft strikes in Northwestern Pakistan and NATO raids across the Afghan border – either of which could be considered an overstepping of U.S. authority and a violation of Pakistan’s territorial integrity – have done little more than anger the locals and encourage the Taliban to advance into the heart of Pakistan.[1] There has been almost no way for the United States to monitor or control billions of dollars in aid it has sent to Pakistan,[2] and neither money nor harsh words have been able to compel the Pakistani government into sustained or predictable action.

The lack of cohesion between the different wings of Pakistani authority has made it very difficult for Pakistan to carry out any such sustained or predictable action against the Taliban. The Pakistani government, headed by President Zardari, would very much like to prevent the Taliban from reaching the seat of government in Islamabad. However, unlike General Musharraf’s previous administration, the current government does not have the unquestioned loyalty of the Pakistani Army,[3] which makes it very difficult for the government to force the army to take action against the Taliban. Unfortunately for the government, the Pakistani Army would rather not launch operations against the Taliban, being more concerned with India to the east, particularly in light of heightened tensions with India after the terrorist attacks on Mumbai in November 2008. Indeed, it seems unclear if the army would defend the current government if it came close to being overthrown as long as the likely successor was not pro-Indian.[4]

In addition to the government and the army, the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) (incidentally the agency which originally supported the Taliban)[5] has its own agenda, specifically concentrating on undermining the Indian-ruled portion of Kashmir.[6] To this end, the ISI has covertly supported militant Punjabi groups operating in Kashmir. Such groups have been hard to control, though. The group responsible for the Mumbai attacks, Lashkar-e-Taiba, was one such group.[7] Others are suspected to have links to the Taliban.[8]

With so many different branches of government working at cross-purposes, it is no wonder that the money and rhetoric of the United States have had little success in compelling Pakistan to counter the Taliban.

As grim and as frustrating the situation is, there have been some encouraging signs as of late. The Taliban seems to have moved too fast and too forcefully in its latest push, as it has generated a lot of public backlash recently. A video of a woman getting publicly flogged for a minor crime has sparked particular anger among Pakistanis this past year.[9] In addition, the Pakistani government, alarmed at the proximity of the Taliban to the capital and embarrassed by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s assertion that it was “basically abdicating to the Taliban,”[10] has gone off on every limb available to get the army to retaliate against the Taliban. For the moment, whatever the government did seems to be working: for nearly a month the Pakistani Army has carried out operations in the Swat Valley against the Taliban, including in Mingora,[11] Swat’s largest city.

It is unclear how long the current Pakistani counteroffensive will last, though, as the Pakistani Army has never sustained a campaign against the Taliban for more than a few months. Indeed, much of the fighting has been done by Pakistani paramilitary forces, which is a sign that the Pakistani Army may not be ready or willing to commit to a long fight. Moreover, the fighting in Swat has caused over 2 million people to become refugees,[12] and if the government does not adequately accommodate such people, then they could become the Taliban’s newest recruitment pool.

It is critical, then, for the United States to try to compel Pakistan to not let this window of opportunity close as previous ones have but rather to take advantage of such opportunity to turn the tide against the Taliban.

[1] http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_TNVGGJDT
[2] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/27/pakistan.usa
[3] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/army.htm
[4] http://spectator.org/archives/2009/05/12/the-pakistan-army-reluctant-wa
[5] http://www.cfr.org/publication/10551/
[6] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kashmir.htm
[7]http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/08/world/asia/08terror.html
[8] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/world/asia/14punjab.html?pagewanted=all
[9] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/02/taliban-pakistan-justice-women-flogging
[10]http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/23/us/politics/23clinton.html
[11] http://www.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/113/article_3894.asp
[12] http://www.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/113/article_3894.asp

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Crisis in Pakistan: A Marshall Plan for Pakistan?

Part 4 of a 6 part essay on the growing threat of the Taliban in Pakistan and how to combat it

In order to begin to permanently roll back the Taliban, the Pakistani government must give the Pakistani people confidence that it can effectively provide for them and can rule fairly and efficiently.

The capitalist governments of Western Europe faced similar challenges after WWII, when Communist parties were growing in appeal among disillusioned Europeans in the wake of the war’s utter devastation. At this critical juncture in history, the United States undertook a massive aid operation known as the Marshall Plan in which it funded reconstruction programs designed by individual Western countries. In this fashion, the United States helped Britain, France, Italy, and most other European countries to rebuild their infrastructure and lay the foundations for future prosperity. In enacting such recovery plans, the Western European governments regained the confidence of their citizens and halted the spread of Communism.

President Zardari has requested on occasion for Pakistan to receive a Marshall Plan of its own.[1] But what President Zardari envisions is largely an extension of the existing aid sent to Pakistan – aid that disappears off the radar once in Pakistan. What distinguished the original Marshall Plan from subsequent aid programs – and which has also made it by far the most successful of such programs – is that it required each European government to come up with its own specific recovery plan and means of implementing such a plan.[2]

A true replica of the Marshall Plan – in which the Pakistani government would design its own specific development program and detail exactly where and when money would be spent before receiving U.S. funding – may be exactly what Pakistan needs. The responsibility of having to come up with and execute plans for reform and development could compel the Pakistani government to root out corruption and increase efficiency. Holding the Pakistani government to a specific, detailed spending program, perhaps with inspections or Congressional benchmarks, would allow the United States to ensure that its aid was being put to its intended uses.

If designed and implemented correctly, this new Marshall Plan would not only help develop and reform Pakistan but would also help alleviate the discontent among the Pakistani public that the Taliban has been able to benefit so greatly from. The sight of the Pakistani government actively developing and reforming its country would greatly improve its standing among its people, who are unaccustomed to such action from its government. If the government became less corrupt and more efficient in the process of designing and executing such development and reform programs, it would also improve its standing among Pakistanis, who have grown cynical in the wake of past and ongoing government corruption. The positive economic impact such programs would have and the influx of jobs they would likely provide would also ease the discontent of the Pakistani public and may make them have more faith in the current system and be less enthusiastic of looking for a new system, which the Taliban has been offering.

Such a plan, provided it is done right, would be in the interest of many powerful figures and institutions in Pakistan. President Zardari should be very receptive to such a plan, as it would allow him to regain credibility with the public that he has all but lost in the wake of the episode with Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry and Nawaz Sharif last March.[3] The Pakistani Army should also support such a plan, as it would increase the legitimacy and popularity of the government, which would lessen the chance of insurrection; as non-chalant as its attitude toward the government is, the last thing the Pakistani Army wants to deal with is a full-blown rebellion or civil war. Moreover, if the Taliban attacked government workers trying to work on development projects, it would greatly harm the Taliban’s reputation among the Pakistani people and would provide easy justification for further retaliation against the Taliban.

Getting powerful regional leaders, particularly Nawaz Sharif – the “Lion of Punjab”[4] and President Zardari’s chief political rival – to approve of a Marshall Plan for Pakistan would be more difficult, as President Zardari would likely want to use his own people to execute the programs he designs so as to undercut his regional rivals. When reviewing such programs, then, the United States should insist on having some regional authorities carry out such programs as a condition for providing funding.

There is no better way of undermining the Taliban in the long term than to alleviate the discontent of the Pakistani public. A true Marshall Plan for Pakistan would do just that.

[1] http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/Pakistan/Zardari-seeks-aid-like-Marshall-Plan-for-Pakistan/articleshow/4412121.cms
[2] http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/May/20080522120728WRybakcuH0.1443598.html
[3] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/05/magazine/05zardari-t.html?_r=1&ref=magazine
[4] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/05/magazine/05zardari-t.html?_r=1&ref=magazine

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Crisis in Pakistan: Working with China and Russia

Part 5 of a 6 part essay on the growing threat of the Taliban in Pakistan and how to combat it

In addition to trying to set up a Marshall Plan for Pakistan, the United States should also strive to work together with other regional powers, such as China and Russia, to put more forceful pressure on Pakistan and to jointly try to counter the Taliban. It is in interest of all three countries to prevent the Taliban from toppling the Pakistani government. A major Taliban victory in Pakistan may spur on Muslim extremist groups in China, who are mainly Uyghurs fighting for an independent nation in Xinjiang,[1] a region that has been independent from China for most of history and has been part of modern China for barely 60 years.[2] To this point, Muslim extremism in China has been relatively low-key, serving more as an excuse for Chinese crackdowns in the region than as a legitimate threat to Chinese security.[3] However, a major Taliban victory could provide momentum and encouragement to Uyghur Muslim extremists, and should Taliban militants manage to take control of the Chinese border with Pakistan, they could send support through to Xinjiang – the part of China that borders Pakistan – and could help the Uyghur Muslim extremists become a formidable force. In addition, a civil war in Pakistan could lead to refugees pouring into China from Pakistan. China does not even want to entertain such possibilities, and so should be willing to work with the United States to stop the Taliban. As Pakistan’s steady ally since the Cold War, China should have a fair ability to compel Pakistan to counter the Taliban.

Although perhaps it should not be as worried as China, Russia should nevertheless be concerned about the growth of the Taliban and the possibility of the collapse of the Pakistani government. Muslim extremists in Chechnya and other Russian-controlled Caucasian regions could be encouraged by a major Taliban victory. In addition, the destabilization of Pakistan by the Taliban could lead to a further destabilization of Afghanistan by Afghani Taliban, which could cause refugee flows and headaches for the neighboring Central Asian states, which Russia would like to retain as its sphere of influence. Indeed, Russian troops stationed on the Tajikistan border could get caught up in a mess in neighboring Afghanistan.

The United States should reach out to China and Russia on the basis of having a common interest in defeating the Taliban and try to facilitate cooperation and joint action in the region to stop the Taliban. For starters, the United States, China, and Russia should put pressure on India to ease tensions with Pakistan that have been especially high since the Mumbai attacks. As India’s steady ally since the Cold War, Russia should have a fair amount of influence over India, and surely the last thing India wants is for a radical Muslim group to take over Pakistan and its nuclear weapons. Getting India to do as little as tone down its rhetoric and assure Pakistan it has no intentions of war and wants friendship and cooperation could help diffuse tensions. Getting India to restart talks on Kashmir would have an even greater effect at lowering tensions. If tensions between India and Pakistan could be reduced, then the Pakistani Army would feel more comfortable about moving troops away from the Indian border (where most of them are now stationed) to Pakistan’s northwest to fight the Taliban.

The United States should also try to get an alternate supply route to Afghanistan through Russia and the Central Asian states. The United States could make the point to Russia that the more powerful the Taliban is in Afghanistan, the more powerful it will be in Pakistan. With the Taliban now in control of most of Northwestern Pakistan, it is able to threaten the current supply routes into Afghanistan, which pass through Pakistan. With the help of Russia, who has considerable influence over the Central Asian states, the United States would probably be able to get a new supply route through Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan into Afghanistan, or perhaps through some other route in the same general region.

The United States should also try to get China and Russia to apply joint diplomatic, rhetorical, and possibly economic pressure on Pakistan. The combined weight of these three powers may be more effective than unilateral U.S. pressure in compelling Pakistan into action against the Taliban. China and the United States in particular could orchestrate joint economic sanctions or incentives to try to put more pressure on the Pakistani government.

Most importantly, the United States, China, and Russia, along with India, should go about sharing intelligence to try to pinpoint the location and status of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the four should also consider devising a coordinated strategy to eliminate such weapons or confront a new Pakistani regime if the worst should befall the current Pakistani government. The last things any of these countries want are more unaccounted-for nuclear weapons, particularly when they or their allies could be potential targets.

[1] http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/directive-08142008114700.html
[2] http://muslimvillage.com/story.php?id=2713
[3] http://www.atimes.com/china/CK15Ad01.html

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Crisis in Pakistan: Conclusion

Part 6 of a 6 part essay on the growing threat of the Taliban in Pakistan and how to combat it

There are some who believe that the Taliban has no chance of toppling the Pakistani government. There are others who believe that it is only a matter of time before Taliban militants follow in the footsteps of the other great revolutionaries of history and take over all of Pakistan. Both views are inaccurate, and resigning to either is a disservice to the victims of the September 11th attacks and the thousands of others who have died trying to prevent Muslim extremists from ever threatening the United States again. The reality is that, over the course of the past decade, the Taliban has grown stronger and stronger in Pakistan to the point that, despite still controlling a minority of Pakistan, the Taliban now poses a serious threat to the existence of Pakistan. It is also true that the Pakistani government, for a variety of reasons, has been unable to effectively counter the rise of the Taliban up to this point.

The United States must realize that, in the next few years, there is a realistic chance that the Taliban could destabilize or even take over Pakistan. It must recognize the international repercussions of either event, particularly the possibility of unaccounted-for nuclear weapons, and must begin to think about how to react to either event. However, President Obama and the United States must also continue to recognize that a Taliban takeover is not imminent, nor is it certain, and the United States must also realize that, while its influence is not as great in Pakistan as it is in other countries, it is not non-existent either. President Obama must exhaust every reasonable, feasible option to prevent the Taliban from going the extra 60 miles to Islamabad. He must be tenacious and resourceful, yet smart; he must be wary of damaging long-term relations and should not address this problem unilaterally, as did his predecessor. He must act within U.S. limitations, but he must act now; the window of opportunity provided by the Pakistani Army may not last long, and given how far the Taliban has come, it may be the last one.

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A Tale of Economic Hardship: Human Rights First and the Madoff Fallout

I know I do not need to remind anyone of the bleak state of the economy: the impact of the current global economic downturn has been hard-felt and all-encompassing. Indeed, not too long ago, someone in my immediate family lost her job, victimized not by any fault of her own – in fact, she is the most capable and hardworking person I know – but by number-crunching and panicking management, the most potent foes in this deepening recession.

Needless to say, non-profit organizations and foreign policy interest groups have been hit hard by the current downturn; failed investments and less willing donors have damaged their budgets at a time when people are less willing than ever to donate money to fight for issues that do not directly concern them.

Among all these groups, one particular victim stood out to me recently.

Given the current policymaking environment, one would think that Human Rights First (HRF) and other human rights groups would be greatly encouraged. In some of his first executive orders, President Obama ordered the closing of Guantanamo Bay within a year, granted enemy combatants the protections listed in the Geneva Conventions, and required those interrogating enemy combatants to follow the Army Field Manual interrogation guidelines.[1] Such a dramatic reversal in policy is unprecedented in the human rights movement, and for human rights activists it is not only a victory to be celebrated but also an invaluable opportunity to ensure the success of and the prolonging of such policy.

In normal economic times, HRF would be in a great position to encourage and build on such policy. But HRF has not seen normal economic times for a while now; last December, HRF was met with a nasty surprise when it learned that two of its most generous donors, the JEHT Foundation and the Picower Foundation,[2] had their funds managed by Bernard Madoff, who had recently admitted that his firm and the $50 billion it managed was a giant Ponzi scheme.[3] As a result, both foundations were forced to dissolve and had to rescind their annual contributions to HRF.[4][5]

The loss of this funding has left HRF with a $1 million budget deficit for this year, about 10% of its annual budget. Worse yet, HRF was also granted additional funds from the now defunct JEHT foundation for 2010 and 2011, and the Picower Foundation was a regular annual donor, so these losses leave HRF with a $3 million shortfall over the next three years.[6]

HRF’s Refugee Protection Program will likely take one of the biggest blows, as it expected to receive $250,000 from the Picower Foundation this year.[7] It will be a shame if this program needs to be trimmed; the program has been a tremendous help for refugees seeking asylum in the United States, providing them not only with legal representation but also with useful information about the communities they hope to move into, such as the location and contact numbers of public places. This program is one of the largest of its kind in the United States and perhaps does the most practical good out of all of HRF’s initiatives.[8]

HRF is not the only advocacy group experiencing financial trouble in these tough economic times; indeed, the JEHT Foundation, in addition to its grants to HRF, also provided funding to Human Rights Watch (HRW), the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and numerous other advocacy groups.[9] With such advocacy groups struggling in this downturn, it will be interesting to see just how the political climate in Washington will be affected, in particular how much such groups will be able to monitor President Obama’s agenda of change, both here and abroad.

If you would like to help out HRF and make a donation, click here.

[1] http://www.whitehouse.gov/executive-orders-to-date/
[2] http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/georgepacker/2009/01/from-all-iraqi.html
[3] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/12/business/12scheme.html?_r=1
[4] http://www.jehtfoundation.org/news/
[5] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/20/business/20foundation.html?ref=business
[6] http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/georgepacker/2009/01/from-all-iraqi.html
[7] http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/georgepacker/2009/01/from-all-iraqi.html
[8] http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/asylum.htm
[9] http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/funderprofile.asp?fndid=5267&category=79

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What it Takes to be an Island: The Ukrainian-Romanian Dispute Over the Status of Snake Island

The following is the second of two potentially groundbreaking cases concerning maritime delimitation and island sovereignty that were pending in the International Court of Justice in 2008.

Dictionary.com defines an island as “a tract of land completely surrounded by water, and not large enough to be called a continent.”[1] The international community, by contrast, has had a hard time finding and agreeing upon a definition as straightforward or as universal.

In this era of fixed national boundaries, bountiful maritime resources, and global naval trade, adequately defining an island and distinguishing between an island and, say, a pile of rocks are more important than ever, with the extent of a nation’s maritime boundaries – and, by extension, its exclusive economic zones – hanging in the balance: Article 121, Section 3 of the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 (LOSC) – the most recent attempt to establish an international consensus on the definition of an island and other naval guidelines – states that, “Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”[2]

This clause was the centerpiece of a long-standing dispute between Romania and Ukraine over the status of Snake Island, which was recently resolved in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Snake Island, if it can be called an island, is a small, X-shaped landmass made of limestone in the middle of the Black Sea, right near the maritime border between Romania and Ukraine. Around 100 people[3] live on the landmass in a town called Bile Village,[4] and Odessa National University has a permanent scientific expedition on the landmass. In addition, Snake Island has a helicopter platform, radio and cell-phone towers, a lighthouse, a bank, and a post office, among other things.[5]

In ancient times, the landmass was best known as the final resting place of the Greek heroes Achilles and Patroclus. In modern times, it has become an important and controversial piece of the ever-changing Black Sea maritime boundaries. For nearly 150 years, Snake Island alternated between Russian and Ottoman rule, as it was located near the maritime border between the two empires; indeed, it was even the site of a naval battle between the two – the Battle of Fidonisi. In 1878, the landmass became part of a new, independent, Romanian state in the aftermath of another clash between the Russians and the Ottomans. Snake Island remained part of Romania until after WWII, when the Soviets, after having occupied it during the war, compelled Communist Romania to cede it to the Soviet Union. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, custody of Snake Island fell to Ukraine.[6]

As it became clear that Snake Island itself would not be in its possession again, Romania began to argue, first with the Soviet Union, then with Ukraine, about how the landmass affected maritime boundaries. As tensions on the issue began to heat up in the mid 1990s, Romania and Ukraine agreed to take the case to the ICJ if they had not reached a separate agreement in 2 years; Romania would finally file the case in 2004. With the discovery of oil and natural gas in the seabed around the island – albeit only 2-3 years worth – the stakes are now arguably higher than ever.[7]

Throughout the case, Ukraine maintained that Snake Island was, in fact, an island, arguing that the small village and modern development of the landmass were indicators that the “human habitation” and “economic life” stipulated by Article 121 of the LOSC were taking place on the landmass, making it qualify as an island.[8]

Romania, by contrast, argued that Snake Island’s lack of fresh water and arable soil – it’s composed primarily of limestone – rendered it incapable of supporting “human habitation” on its own, which, therefore, made it a cliff, not an island. Furthermore, Romania accused Ukraine of building up and populating the landmass, thereby violating an earlier agreement with Romania where Ukraine would consider the landmass “uninhabited.”[9]

In reviewing this case, the ICJ had a chance to set a far-reaching precedent in international law about maritime delimitation. In interpreting Article 121 of the LOSC, the ICJ had a chance to establish the first clear international definition of an island.

The competing interpretations of Article 121 result in significantly different definitions of an island and would have very different implications for maritime delimitation. At first, Romania’s opinion may appear more reasonable: if a landmass cannot, by its own virtue, support human life, then it would seem illogical to consider it an island under the LOSC.

But, then again, even if Snake Island did have arable land and fresh water, would its size permit it to have enough of either to sustain human life on its own? Surely there are many tiny islands scattered across the globe that have vegetation and fresh water but still rely on outside aid to maintain its human population. By this logic, one could argue Ukraine is simply being practical by developing and supplying Snake Island from the mainland.

Ruling in favor of Ukraine would send a dangerous message to the rest of the world, as it would encourage other countries to populate and develop any of their remote landmasses in order to argue that it is sustaining human habitation and should therefore qualify as an island. In this fashion, countries could use the island status to claim a larger exclusive economic zone, potentially enabling them access to more resources and naval trade. Such a “development race” could play out on a grand scale in the Pacific Ocean, where numerous countries have claimed numerous stretches of ocean with many small landmasses that may or may not be already considered islands.

Yet ruling in favor of Romania could have an opposite but equally potent impact on maritime delimitation. Instead of building up islands to try to gain a larger portion of a sea or ocean, countries could instead question the validity of the status of numerous landmasses throughout the world’s oceans and seas, which could roll back the existing maritime boundaries of some countries to the benefit of others.

Rather than to set either of these precedents, the ICJ dodged the issue, making no ruling on the status of Snake Island but granting Romania 80% of the disputed Black Sea waters.[10] While this latest dispute seems to have been resolved, the controversy over the definition of an island and what having the status of an island means for maritime delimitation remains unresolved. With many more maritime disputes in other regions likely to come, the ICJ may not be able to dodge the island question forever. International lawmakers would do well to use this time to consider what the answer should be, for it will have implications on maritime boundaries for years to come.


[1] http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/island
[2] http://www.globelaw.com/LawSea/ls82_3.htm#article_121_regime_of_islands
[3] http://www.mlahanas.de/Greeks/Cities/SnakeIsland.html
[4] http://www.mfa.gov.ua/mfa/en/publication/content/8214.htm
[5] http://www.mlahanas.de/Greeks/Cities/SnakeIsland.html
[6] http://www.mlahanas.de/Greeks/Cities/SnakeIsland.html
[7] http://www.mlahanas.de/Greeks/Cities/SnakeIsland.html
[8] http://www.mfa.gov.ua/mfa/en/publication/content/8214.htm
[9] http://www.mlahanas.de/Greeks/Cities/SnakeIsland.html
[10] http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/romania-resolves-snake-island-conflict-ukraine/article-179141?Ref=RSS

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The Latest Israel-Hamas Conflict and Where Israel Should Go From Here

Last December, 2008, after a renewed rocket barrage from Hamas ended hopes of an extended ceasefire, Israel launched a large-scale retaliatory air and ground assault on the radical Muslim group in Gaza.

Three weeks, 1300 Palestinian deaths, and $2 billion worth of devastation later[1], not much seems to have changed, other than potential election gains for some.[2] Hamas may be weakened, but it is not broken, and its rocket attacks have not stopped.[3] Moreover, Hamas still has the support of the majority of Gazans.[4]

Indeed, if anything, the situation seems to have gotten worse for Israel, not better. Moderate Arab governments, particularly those of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are under more intense pressure than ever to defy Israel and support their Arab brothers in Gaza.[5] Support for Israel across the world has further plummeted as a result of the deadly scale of the operations in Gaza.[6] Worst of all, support amongst Palestinians for the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority, the government that Israel had hoped to bolster as a moderate alternative to Hamas, has all but evaporated, with Palestinians increasingly associating Fatah with Israel and thinking, perhaps rightly so, that Fatah does not have their best interests at heart.[7]

Although Israel demonstrated in the recent conflict that it can and will not hesitate to muster overwhelming military might, it has also shown that it can not achieve its goals through such force.

The fact that Israel had to intervene militarily in Gaza to try to fulfill its goals is indicative of the failure of its two-year-long attempt to isolate Hamas by blockading Gaza. In the short run, Israel had hoped that the blockade would cut off Hamas from its funding and weapons smugglers. In the long run, Israel had hoped that the blockade would make living conditions awful enough in Gaza for the Gazans to shift their support from Hamas to Fatah and maybe even to rebel against Hamas.

This complete blockade has not advanced either of Israel’s goals. It has not enabled short-term peace and has in fact worsened long-term prospects for peace: as the U.S.-Muslim Engagement Project stated in its recent publication, Changing Course: A New Direction for U.S. Relations with the Muslim World, “Israel’s… isolation of Gaza… undermine[s] security for all” and has ended up “encouraging extremism.”[8]

Israel should seek to change its current strategy rather than to continue to compensate for its failure by making more incursions into Gaza. Egypt, too, should strive for a more effective strategy, as it fears the growing influence and appeal of Hamas and its parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, amongst Egyptians. In the coming weeks and months, particularly after the new Israeli government takes over, Israel should work together with Egypt to jointly lift sanctions on purely economic products and activities that cross the Gaza border while intensifying crackdowns on weapons smuggling, especially the smuggling tunnels that bypass the Egypt-Gaza border. The Egyptians should improve their enforcement of their section of the Gaza border to ensure maximum efficiency, perhaps by raising the salaries of border guards, giving bonuses to guards for each tunnel they find and destroy, or through some other means. Perhaps an international peacekeeping force could help police the border as well. In addition, the Israeli and Egyptian navies might do well to enlist the help of other navies, perhaps the U.S. navy, to help make sure no weapons are smuggled into Gaza from the Mediterranean Sea.

Lifting some economic sanctions does not mean completely opening the border or leaving it unguarded. Indeed, Israel and Egypt should maintain all of the checkpoints that guard the Gaza border and should conduct thorough checks on anything and everything that passes through to ensure that no weapons get in or out. Nor should Israel and Egypt lift sanctions on absolutely everything; they should use export control models like those of the United States or some other country to determine whether a certain product or material could possibly be used in a weapon or have other military applications.

With these conditions in place, it would not seem so perilous for Israel and Egypt to allow economic activity into and out of Gaza. Such activity would have great long-term implications for Gaza and Israel, slowly, but surely lifting Gazans out of poverty and giving them some semblance of a normal life, which they would think twice about risking simply for the sake of radical, lofty goals of jihad and the overthrow of Israel. Moreover, if Israel were to allow economic activity into and out of Gaza and refrain from constantly invading it, Gazans would have a chance at prosperity and a better life, and perhaps then Gazans would not blame Israel and the West for whatever problems they might have and might develop a more favorable view of Israel.

Such a shift toward a prosperous, moderate Gaza would do more harm to Hamas than all of the bombs and troops Israel has ever sent its way. The bulk of Hamas’ support comes from Palestinians dissatisfied with their poverty and mistreatment by Israel but also with the corruption of past Palestinian governments; indeed, one of Hamas’ earliest functions was garbage collection, which had been largely neglected by the Palestinian Authority.[9] If Gazans were allowed a chance to prosper and were free from periodic devastation from Israel, they would probably be more hesitant to support a group whose stated goal is to wipe out the state of Israel, regardless of any other services it provides, for fear of losing their wealth and security.

When Gazans start to believe that they can obtain better lives through moderate means, then they will stop pursuing radical goals and supporting radical groups, like Hamas. If the Israeli government has the courage (in light of the view of much of the Israeli public) to encourage this idea, it will pay off in the long run. With a new American administration in place and a new Israeli one to come, and with Israeli operations finally at an end, for now, this may be as opportune a moment as ever for Israeli policy to shift toward this goal – and long-term peace.

[1]http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1057132.html
[2]http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1873084,00.html?iid=tsmodule
[3]http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1232100165159&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
[4]http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2009/01/23/ST2009012303518.html
[5]http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/10/world/middleeast/10cairo.html?fta=y
[6]http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/13/gaza-israel-war-crimes
[7]http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0CEFDC1F3CF936A25752C0A96F9C8B63
[8]http://www.usmuslimengagement.org/storage/usme/documents/Changing_Course_-_A_New_Direction_for_US_Relations_with_the_Muslim_World.pdf (p. 41)
[9]http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/hamas-plays-on-its-welfare-credentials-in-historic-elections-488243.html

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The Mumbai Attacks and the Future of Indian-Pakistani and U.S.-Pakistani Relations

With tensions between India and Pakistan escalating in the wake of last November’s terrorist attacks in Mumbai, Barack Obama need not look any further as to where his first test as President will come.

Relations between the two South Asian nuclear powers have deteriorated to their worst level since the beginning of the decade – that time also a result of a terrorist attack in India – with enraged Indian officials and defensive Pakistani officials trading accusations and retorts and people in both countries protesting in the streets against their South Asian rival, and although both countries deny they want war, each seems to be moving closer toward it, the most ominous sign being Pakistan’s recent redeployment of troops from the Afghan border to the Indian border.[1]

Upon taking office, Mr. Obama should pressure Pakistan with all of the means at the United States’ disposal to withdraw its troops from the Indian border and to ensure that a credible investigation into the activities of Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Pakistani Muslim extremist group allegedly responsible for the attack,[2] particularly how the group was able to evade Pakistani authorities, goes to completion. Although it is important that India does not further agitate the situation, evidence of Pakistan’s negligence and even alleged support of Lashkar-e-Taiba, as well as Pakistan’s recent mobilization along the Indian border seem to point to Pakistan as the main instigator of the current crisis, so it seems that compelling Pakistan to back off is essential in diffusing the renewed tensions between the two South Asian rivals.

In being more forceful toward Pakistan in this situation, Mr. Obama should not only seek to repair relations between India and Pakistan, but should also use the opportunity to redefine U.S relations with Pakistan. Under the Bush Administration, the United States was far too lenient with regard to Pakistan, providing it with fairly unconditional support to fight the Taliban and Al Qaeda along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan and to safeguard of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal from extremist groups. While these goals are important to pursue, the Obama Administration should make it very clear to Pakistan that it can not hope to receive the same amount of aid and favorable treatment from the United States that it has enjoyed for the past eight years if it does not adequately use them to fulfill the said goals and that the United States is willing, however reluctantly, to relinquish such aid and treatment if the job is not done adequately. In acting accordingly, Mr. Obama will be able to demonstrate that he truly does mean to be an agent of change, and internationally as well as domestically.

One of the best tools at Mr. Obama’s disposal for influencing Pakistan is the sheer weight of America’s annual Pakistani military aid package, which totaled $5.4 billion in February 2008.[3] As U.S President, Mr. Obama should explain to Pakistan that the United States will not continue to give the Pakistani military billions of dollars intended to help with the fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Waziristan only to have Pakistan station its troops along the Indian border, hundreds of miles away from the Islamic militants it is being subsidized to fight. Furthermore, Mr. Obama should expound on how the ability of an Islamic extremist group like Lashkar-e-Taiba to operate within Pakistan and from there strike abroad is an indication that the Pakistani military has not been able to effectively suppress the Islamic radicals within its country.

While Mr. Obama should not immediately halt aid to the Pakistani military, he should hint that he is not afraid to resort to such a measure, explaining how in these tough economic times, when the U.S. government is running a budget deficit of over $1 trillion,[4] the United States is looking to cut costs wherever money is not being well spent and that, given the circumstances in Pakistan, it appears that such money given to Pakistan has not been well spent.[5] In order to continue to receive aid then, he should continue, Pakistan should demonstrate that such money is being well spent. A good start would be to redeploy the troops stationed along the Indian border back to the northwestern provinces and to investigate how Lashkar-e-Taiba was able to operate within Pakistan and make adjustments accordingly.

Hopefully other methods will be able to convince Pakistan to stop mobilizing troops along the Indian border and to conduct a thorough investigation into Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Mumbai attacks, but should the United States resort to threatening to reduce or halt military aid to Pakistan, it is likely that not only the civilian government but also the Pakistani military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the two main beneficiaries of the U.S. aid,[6] would be in agreement to redeploy Pakistani troops away from the Indian border.

At any rate, under the Obama Administration the United States should develop an alternative strategy for being able to combat the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Pakistan as well as to prevent Pakistan’s nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of radicals that does not involve providing billions of dollars in aid to the Pakistani military. Such a contingency plan would make the United States more confident about threatening to cut off aid to Pakistan.

It is hard to say exactly what the best arrangement might be. Perhaps the best strategy would be fairly similar to the current one – in which Pakistan would support the United States in its conflict with the Taliban and Al Qaeda – but just with different mechanics. The current strategy is not built for long-term success: by giving money to the military, the United States is merely perpetuating the dominance of that institution over the civilian government that has existed throughout modern Pakistan’s history, as evidenced by the various civilian governments that have been overthrown by military dictators like Generals Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf.[7] Furthermore, it is almost impossible for the United States to control how the Pakistani military spends its funds, which is a recipe for waste and misuse.[8]

A strategy that dealt directly with the civilian government may be more efficient than the current one and might move Pakistan in a better direction for the long run. Perhaps a favorable trade arrangement with Pakistan in return for military action against the Taliban and Al Qaeda instead of direct military aid would at least be less of a waste of money and might even strengthen the Pakistani economy and, by extension, the civilian government.

Placing more emphasis on the civilian government has its own risks, though. Pakistani civilian government has been more known for corruption than efficiency or democracy: indeed, the last three prime ministers with effective control – Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, and Yousaf Raza Gillani, currently in office – have been indicted on corruption charges at some point in their careers.[9] It would take a very dedicated, skillful, and accountable civilian administration indeed to rule effectively over the country and the military, and Pakistan may not have that for a while.

While Mr. Obama should keep these considerations for long-term U.S.-Pakistani in mind, for the moment he should confine them within the context for the current crisis; diffusing tensions and averting war between India and Pakistan should be the Mr. Obama’s immediate goal in the region, for a large-scale and potentially nuclear war that would destabilize the region is in no one’s interest.

[1]http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/29/world/asia/29india.html?_r=1&scp=7&sq=India+no+clear+diplomatic&st=nyt
[2]http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/world/asia/29intel.html?scp=1&sq=Lashkar+responsible+Mumbai&st=nyt
[3]http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/27/pakistan.usa
[4]http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/08/business/economy/08deficit.html?hp
[5]http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/27/pakistan.usa
[6]http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/27/pakistan.usa
[7]http://www.newstatesman.com/200206030017
[8]http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/27/pakistan.usa
[9]http://www.newstatesman.com/200206030017

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The Georgia-Russia Conflict: Origins of the Conflict and Georgian and Russian Motives

Part 1 of a 6 part essay on the recent conflict in Georgia, its causes, and its potential implications.

Russia’s retaliatory bombing and invasion of Georgia last month and the ongoing aftermath has developed into one of the most troubling international episodes of this decade. Russia’s belligerent response to Georgian operations in South Ossetia, a Georgian breakaway province, confirmed what had already been Russia’s scarcely hidden intention to dominate its neighbors, particularly those in the Caucasus and in Eastern Europe. The anemic Western response in the face of Russian aggression against one of its newest allies underscores the significant leverage Russia has attained this past decade over Europe and America, and such inaction bears disturbing similarity to the feeble Western response to Hitler’s aggression preceding WWII. In the following months, the United States and Europe would do well to punish Russia in a more meaningful manner than they have so far, or else resurgent Russia will be only further emboldened to bluntly wield its hard power over its weaker neighbors.

Of all of its comparatively weak Caucasus neighbors, perhaps none have been more of a thorn in Russia’s side lately than Georgia, particularly in the four years since the election of President Mikheil Saakashvili. Under President Saakashvili’s liberal economic reforms, the once poor Georgian economy is showing signs of life, experiencing 10% growth in 2007 (although unemployment and poverty could have been lower).[1] In addition, President Saakashvili rooted out much of the corruption that had existed within the government under its previous president – the former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.[2]

Worse yet for Russia, President Saakashvili has consistently taken a defiant stance towards its giant neighbor. From the very beginning of his Presidency, President Saakashvili has strived to reestablish Georgian control over the country’s several breakaway provinces: indeed, in the first months of his Presidency he succeeded in regaining control over the Southwestern breakaway province of Ajara.[3] In addition, President Saakashvili has reached out to the West, particularly the United States: Georgia had as many as 2,000 troops in Iraq as part of the coalition forces, and U.S. President George W. Bush received an exceptionally warm welcome from President Saakashvili and the rest of Tbilisi in 2005, among other things.[4]

Most critical of all, Georgia has increasingly sought membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a move that Russia has repeatedly stated it would not tolerate, and it is easy to see why: for a Russia that seeks to have a strong influence over its neighbors, the idea of a Western alliance being extended to include one of its bordering countries, particularly one in an area that Russia has long considered to be in its sphere of influence, is unacceptable.[5]

Conveniently for Russia, though, Georgia’s breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have presented a relatively easy opportunity for undermining the increasingly pesky Caucasus state. These two separatist regions won de facto independence in the first few years after the independence of Georgia itself after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Although no country recognizes either region’s statehood (except for Russia, which formally recognized the areas a few days ago), their autonomy has been preserved for over a decade, thanks in large part to significant Russian aid and a ceasefire arrangement monitored by Russian “peacekeepers.”[6]

The Georgians claim that both regions are integral parts of Georgia and that there would be a Georgian majority in both territories if it were not for the forced deportation of Georgian citizens, and so they have been outraged at the regions’ autonomy, viewing it as an unacceptable violation of Georgia’s territorial integrity, not only by the Abkhaz and Ossetian separatists, but also by the Russian “peacekeepers” that have been stationed in the regions. The Abkhaz and the Ossetians, meanwhile, argue that their distinct languages and cultures should give them the right to self-determination.[7]

Like other ethnic issues in the Caucasus, though, the question of the legitimacy of either of these claims has no easy answer. It is difficult even today for historians to agree on when exactly the Georgians, the Abkhaz, and the other numerous Caucasus tribes gained their present identity. It is true that for part of history, including during much of the Middle Ages, the Abkhaz and Ossetians were part of a Georgian kingdom, but this kingdom itself was a multiethnic entity consisting of various tribes; indeed, the very concept of a Georgian race takes into account several different tribes. Numerous migrations and resettlements of populations have also complicated each ethnicity’s historical ties to the areas each one claims.[8]

The Russians, though, have clearly not reached out towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia because of any sympathy for either region’s aspirations for statehood. Indeed, the Russians have played a complicated game of their own in bolstering these two Georgian breakaway regions, since Russia too rules over several Caucasus regions and peoples that also warm at the idea of statehood, particularly the Chechens. In supporting Abkhazia and South Ossetia, then, the Russians have in fact undermined their authority inside their own borders.[9]

Evidently, though, Russia does not seem to care about promoting such double standards as long as Georgia is weakened as a result; indeed, Russia has gone to great lengths to support the two breakaway territories at Georgia’s expense. In conjunction with imposing several rounds of sanctions on Georgia, Russia has not placed any sanctions on Abkhazia or South Ossetia, allowing movement of people and goods across its borders with the two areas. Russian financial aid helps to keep the regions’ economies and governments afloat, and Russia has even distributed Russian passports to much of the population in each region.[10]

Although Georgia technically initiated last month’s violence by sending troops into South Ossetia, such a conflict seems to compliment Russia’s interests and past support of South Ossetia and Abkhazia too well for one not to be suspicious of a possible Russian instigation of hostilities. The presence of Russian “peacekeepers” and passport holders gave Russia a possible excuse to justify a Russian intervention to the West in the event of Georgian operations. The speed at which the Russian military mobilized and invaded Georgia in response to Georgian military action in South Ossetia seems to suggest that Russia was too ready and prepared for retaliation for it not to have had a hand in the initiation of violence; indeed, with Russian “peacekeepers” already in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, egging on the separatist forces does not seem so hard for Russia. With West-backed Kosovo recently independent from Russian ally Serbia, Georgia up for potential NATO admission in a few months, and much of the world focused on the Beijing Olympics, the timing seemed all too perfect for Russia to strike a blow against its defiant neighbor and send a resounding message to its other neighbors and the West.

Perhaps President Saakashvili was met with a significant enough provocation from Ossetian separatists to justify sending Georgian troops to the region; perhaps he was bent on retaking South Ossetia while the rest of the world was distracted by the Olympics in order to cement his legacy. Whatever the reasoning, though, President Saakashvili should have known better. Instead, he played right into the bear’s hands.

[1] http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/04/europe/georgia.php
[2] http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22519891/
[3] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/weekinreview/10traub.html?pagewanted=1&sq=Taunting%20the%20Bear&st=cse&scp=1
[4] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/weekinreview/10traub.html?pagewanted=1&sq=Taunting%20the%20Bear&st=cse&scp=1
[5] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/weekinreview/10traub.html?pagewanted=1&sq=Taunting%20the%20Bear&st=cse&scp=1
[6] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/weekinreview/10traub.html?pagewanted=1&sq=Taunting%20the%20Bear&st=cse&scp=1
[7] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/weekinreview/10traub.html?pagewanted=1&sq=Taunting%20the%20Bear&st=cse&scp=1
[8] http://armenianhouse.org/villari/caucasus/caucasus-history.html
[9] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/weekinreview/10traub.html?pagewanted=1&sq=Taunting%20the%20Bear&st=cse&scp=1
[10] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/weekinreview/10traub.html?pagewanted=1&sq=Taunting%20the%20Bear&st=cse&scp=1

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The Georgia-Russia Conflict: The Direct Impact on Georgia

Part 2 of a 6 part essay on the recent conflict in Georgia, its causes, and its potential implications.

Now, Georgia and the rest of the world will have to deal with the consequences of Russia’s calculations and President Saakashvili’s miscalculation. For Georgia, the short war with Russia has been devastating: thousands of its people have died or have become refugees, and much of its civilian and military infrastructure has been damaged.[1] Worse yet, the status quo now enforced by the Russians, in which Abkhaz and Ossetian separatists control all of their respective regions and Russian “peacekeepers” even patrol a buffer zone a few miles within Georgia proper, is much worse than the one President Saakashvili tried to reverse with last month’s operations.[2]

In addition, the conflict has highlighted some glaring problems in the Georgian military, which seemed to be inadequately trained and was unable to effectively respond to Russian warplanes and tanks in the weeklong period of intense combat. These tactical failures greatly contributed to Georgia’s defeat in a conflict that has thoroughly underscored Georgia’s relative weakness compared to Russia.[3]

Such a sound defeat of Georgia has sent, as the Russians intended, a clear signal to the Caucasus and Eastern Europe that Russia has no qualms about enforcing its will and backing up its statements in stark contrast to the West, which has taken few practical measures to back up its statements and assurances of support. Russia’s neighbors, particularly Ukraine and Azerbaijan, neither of which have acted as much in accord with Russian interests as Russia would have liked, will likely wonder if they might soon face a similar fate as Georgia if they do not comply with Russian demands.

Indeed, Ukraine and Azerbaijan as well as Moldova also have unruly or disputed regions that have historically been backed by Russia, and one cannot help but wonder if Russia might in the future use such territories as windows for influence and intervention as they did with Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia.


[1] http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-08-27-Georgia-damage_N.htm
[2] http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2008/09/09/russian-troops.html?ref=rss
[3] http://www.redorbit.com/news/international/1525797/georgian_army_proves_to_be_no_match_for_the_russian/

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The Georgia-Russia Conflict: Possible Implications for Ukraine and Crimea

Part 3 of a 6 part essay on the recent conflict in Georgia, its causes, and its potential implications.

Ukraine’s control over the Crimean peninsula in the Post-Cold War era has been a particularly sore spot for the Russians. Crimea is considered by many to be an integral part of Russia and was under continuous Russian control for centuries.[1] Indeed, ethnic Russians make up a majority of Crimea’s population today (though only after decades of eviction of the Crimean Tatars and resettlement by the Russians).[2] After the creation of the Soviet Union, Crimea was part of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), but in 1954 it was given to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkSSR). At the time such an act had little practical significance, but when the former SSRs gained independence with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Crimea found itself as a part of Ukraine instead of Russia because of the earlier transfer.[3]

While Crimea’s historical ties to Russia and its allure as a tourist destination inevitably made the Russians unhappy with the loss, a more critical matter dominated tensions over Crimea: what to do with the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet anchored at the peninsula at Sevastopol.

Such tensions would be eased for the moment, though, with the Treaty of Friendship in 1997 between Ukraine and Russia, in which Russia essentially recognized Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea and, in return, Ukraine let Russia have most of the Black Sea Fleet as well as a long-term lease of a naval base in Sevastopol.[4] Many at the time hoped this agreement would spell the end of the dispute over Crimea and Sevastopol and might eventually pave the way for better relations between Ukraine and Russia. However, tensions have since flared up again between Ukraine and Russia, particularly in the years following the election of the pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko (who, incidentally, was mysteriously poisoned while campaigning in 2004).[5] Ukraine’s ambition to join NATO, as with Georgia’s, has especially angered Russia. Now, in light of last months’ events in South Ossetia and Georgia, Ukraine can only help but wonder if it will pay the same price as Georgia for defying Russia and if such a price will be extracted through a renewal of the dispute over Crimea.

[1] http://8.12.42.31/1997/oct/05/news/mn-39673
[2] http://8.12.42.31/1997/oct/05/news/mn-39673
[3] http://8.12.42.31/1997/oct/05/news/mn-39673
[4] http://8.12.42.31/1997/oct/05/news/mn-39673
[5] http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1213/p01s02-woeu.html

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The Georgia-Russia Conflict: Possible Implications for Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh

Part 4 of a 6 part essay on the recent conflict in Georgia, its causes, and its potential implications.

Ukraine, though, should not be as worried about possible Russian involvement in Crimea as Azerbaijan should be about a possible Russian intervention in its breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh. This predominantly Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan was able to break away from Azerbaijani rule with the help of the military of the country of Armenia in the years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In fact, by the time a ceasefire agreement was reached, Karabakh and Armenian troops were in control of all of Nagorno-Karabakh as well a significant amount of the surrounding territory, including some that bordered Armenia, which allowed for a direct overland connection between Armenia proper and Nagorno-Karabakh.[1]

The Azerbaijanis have naturally been unhappy with the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian troops occupying much of its territory, but they have not had sufficient military might to challenge the status quo.[2] Still, tensions have remained high: skirmishes between Armenian and Azerbaijani troops continue to erupt sporadically, and Azerbaijan has steadily invested its new oil wealth into building up its military, seemingly with the goal of eventually being strong enough to retake the enclave by force.[3]

In taking action with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh, though, Azerbaijan must contend not only with Armenia, but also with Russia, which has been shipping arms and natural gas to Armenia and maintains a sizeable military base in the country. As with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia’s support of Nagorno-Karabakh through Armenia has nothing to do with any sympathy towards the Armenian enclave but rather is a means by which to weaken Azerbaijan.[4] Russia certainly has an interest in undermining Azerbaijan: in addition to being one of its bordering countries, Azerbaijan is also the origin of several East-West oil and natural gas pipelines (some of which run through Georgia) that bypass Russian soil, helping to loosen Russia’s hold on European energy markets. [5] In light of its successful, fairly unimpeded operations against Georgia through South Ossetia and Abkhazia last month, Russia may decide to reassert its dominance over Azerbaijan and, by extension, over energy markets by escalating the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.

[1] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/nagorno-karabakh.htm
[2] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/nagorno-karabakh.htm
[3] http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav070307.shtml#
[4] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/nagorno-karabakh.htm
[5] http://www.slate.com/id/2198292/

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The Georgia-Russia Conflict: Possible Implications for Moldova and Transnistria

Part 5 of a 6 part essay on the recent conflict in Georgia, its causes, and its potential implications.

Perhaps no breakaway region has been as strongly supported by (and, as a result, dependent on) Russia as tiny Moldova’s even tinier breakaway region of Transnistria has been. This miniscule Ukrainian and Russian enclave amidst a country of mostly Romanian-related Moldavians was able to achieve de facto independence in 1992, in no small part due to the support of the former Soviet 14th Army that was stationed there.[1]

Ever since gaining such autonomy, though, Transnistria has been in a rather precarious position. A sliver of land across from the Dniester River spanning only 1,607 square miles, Transnistria has little space for any sort of production (though it is fairly industrialized) and has virtually no cushion in the event of a serious attack. In addition, the small separatist region is landlocked in between Ukraine and Moldova proper, making any sort of trade tricky, since Ukraine does not recognize it and Moldova, of course, still claims it. Indeed, smuggling has been one of the primary sources not of only revenue, but also of goods for Transnistria, but even this option is growing less successful: in recent years Ukraine and Moldova have started to crack down more and more on such smuggling activity with the separatist region.[2]

Fortunately for Transnistria, though, Russia has long provided a good deal of support and aid to the breakaway region so that it has been able to maintain its autonomy from Moldova. From various routes, Russian aid and goods have reached Transnistria, helping it keep its economy afloat. As in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russian passports have been distributed to the people of Transnistria. Most critically of all, though, Russian troops remain in Transnistria, helping to ensure that the weak Moldovan military has little chance of retaking the enclave by force.[3]

Although Russia has been able to maintain a strong presence in Transnistria, it would be significantly more difficult for Russia to launch full-scale military operations against Moldova from the enclave than it was for Russia to do so against Georgia through Abkhazia and South Ossetia, mainly due to the fact that Transnistria does not border Russia, as Abkhazia and South Ossetia do, and also that, given the current tensions, there seems to be little to no chance that Ukraine would allow Russian troops to march through its territory to reach Transnistria. For the moment, though, Russia has no interest in such an operation, since Moldova has not been as troublesome as Ukraine and Azerbaijan, and indeed Russia already maintains a strong hold over Moldova because of its support of Transnistria. However, the possibility of such an operation is certainly on the table, particularly in light of the recent events in Georgia.

[1] http://www.american.edu/ted/ice/moldova.htm
[2] http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/28/world/europe/28ukraine.html?pagewanted=print
[3] http://www.american.edu/ted/ice/moldova.htm

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The Georgia-Russia Conflict: Possible Responses and Long Term Impacts

Part 6 of a 6 part essay on the recent conflict in Georgia, its causes, and its potential implications.

If the West and the rest of the world do not want to see further Russian incursions into countries in Eastern Europe or the Caucasus, they will need to punish Russia more effectively for last month’s incursion into Georgia than they have so far. Unfortunately, the West’s options are constrained by the significant leverage Russia has attained over it. In particular, Western Europe has come to rely heavily on Russian energy exports: the European Union (EU) currently imports nearly half of its natural gas and 30% of its oil.[1] Russia has demonstrated in the past that it is willing to use its energy exports as a political tool, and so European nations are rightfully worried that if they respond too harshly to Russian actions in Georgia – like by imposing sanctions, perhaps – Russia may very well retaliate by halting the exportation of oil and natural gas to the said countries or by raising the prices of such resources. Either move would have a devastating effect on the economies of Europe.

Even the United States has had to rely on Russia in recent years. Sufficient Russian diplomatic pressure could potentially tip the scales in favor of or against the United States with regard to Iran, Sudan, and North Korea. Such support from Russia could not really be counted on, though, if the United States responds too forcefully to last month’s invasion of Georgia.[2]

Despite the weight of Russia’s leverage, Western rhetoric has at least been critical of Russia’s aggression, with EU countries, particularly France, condemning Russian military operations and President Bush calling Russia’s actions “unacceptable in the 21st century.”[3]

China, meanwhile, has not overtly supported or condemned Russia: through a joint statement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China officially supported “the active role of Russia in assisting peace and cooperation in the region” but at the same time expressed “deep concern over the recent tensions surrounding the South Ossetia question and calls for the sides to peacefully resolve existing problems through dialogue.”[4]

Still, the West can and should do more to express its discontent with Russia’s recent actions towards Georgia. Rhetoric may effectively convey opinions and stir emotion, but it has limited practical effect. The option of expelling Russia from the G8 also does not seem very pragmatic and indeed might weaken the legitimacy of the organization. With sanctions seeming too risky and double-edged and direct military intervention absurd, the West should instead focus on rebuilding Georgia, particularly its infrastructure and military, and it should also not put an end to Georgia’s as well as Ukraine’s hopes for joining NATO (though at the same time it should entreat Georgian and Ukrainian leaders not to act so rashly in the future so as to lessen the chances of a repeat of last month’s events in Georgia). In particular, the United States should continue to have military advisors train the Georgian military[5] and should start shipping more weapons to Georgia as well. Such actions would not directly punish Russia, but they would in effect undo some of the gains that Russia hoped to achieve by invading Georgia in the first place.

If nothing else, hopefully last month’s events will push the West to reduce its reliance on Russia in the long term. For Europe, this means lessening its dependence on Russian energy by continuing to pursue alternatives to fossil fuels as well as to keep looking for energy routes (such as the Caucasus pipelines) that bypass Russia. For America, this means moving away from the highly personal relationship with Russia that Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin had cultivated with U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Instead, the United States should move back towards a stricter, more interest-based relationship with Russia.[6]

No matter what further action is taken, though, last month’s Georgia episode has clearly been one of the greatest strains on the current international system of checks and balances. At the moment, the long term lesson from this incident has been that, with enough hard power, a country can do what it pleases without consequence. Indeed, in a way the United States itself has reinforced this impression with its fairly unilateral invasion of Iraq and conduct in its “war on terror.”

Such an environment is eerily similar to that which existed in the years preceding WWII as the international community and the League of Nations did little to hinder the aggressive advances of Japan and Nazi Germany. This would eventually lead to the end of the set international order and of the League of Nations. Hopefully, a similar restructuring will not take place now.

With Russia, though, the rest of the world might get lucky. Russia’s resurgence has been no Renaissance: it has not invested its oil and natural gas wealth into long term economic stability, and so its influence will likely wane as oil and natural gas fall out of use and favor.

The rise of powers such as India and China, though, seem inevitable. Perhaps the most enduring effect of last month’s events in Georgia is what lessons these and other rising countries will take from them.



[1] http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/bg2083.cfm
[2] http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2008/08/why_we_need_to/
[3] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/12/world/europe/12diplo.html
[4] http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/sep2008/sco-s03.shtml
[5] http://www.redorbit.com/news/international/1525797/georgian_army_proves_to_be_no_match_for_the_russian/
[6] http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/933

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The Mongolian Economy: the True Cause of the Mongolia's post-Election Violence

In many ways, Mongolia seems like a country rooted in the past. Much of its people still herd animals astride their horses, living the same, nomadic lifestyle that their ancestors had lived for millennia.[1] Even the steppes over which they herd seem unchanged, with little infrastructure or development puncturing their vast reaches.[2] Any settlements are spread far apart from one another: it is no wonder, then, that Mongolia is the most sparsely populated country on Earth.[3]

Perhaps most telling of all, the ancient, 800 year-old persona of Genghis Khan remains the most prominent figure – and the biggest celebrity – in Mongolia: his image can be found on a host of products, and there are many monuments in his name. Even a side of a hill is adorned with his image. This larger than life figure, who began the conquest of what became the largest contiguous empire in history, embodies the proud past of the Mongol people; a time when they were the rulers of nearly all the known world; a time when nomads were still widespread across the earth, defying the steady advance of sedentary civilization.[4]

For the Mongols, this glorious past seems far better than the present reality they find themselves in, with their country being slow to develop and one of the poorest in Asia, not to mention being sandwiched between two, giant, powerful neighbors: Russia and China.

And yet, in the present global scene, Mongolia finds itself hailed as a hallmark for the future: the United States has referred to Mongolia’s peaceful transition from Communism to a relatively successful democracy as a model of what the post-Cold War era should look like. Even as many of the former Soviet bloc countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia have struggled to implement true democracy and are starting to flounder under renewed Russian influence and even as newly established democracies in Iraq and Gaza have struggled, Mongolia’s democracy has remained relatively fair and functioning, which has made Mongolia attract significant praise – and foreign aid – from the United States.

This past July, though, Mongolia’s acclaimed democracy showed perhaps its first sign of considerable strain when the Democratic Party accused the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) (the former Communist Party) of election fraud in the parliamentary elections that month that were won by the MPRP. These allegations prompted a protest in Ulaanbaatar, the Mongolian capital, which soon degenerated into an angry mob that began vandalizing and looting nearby buildings and even set several buildings on fire, including the headquarters of the MPRP. The Mongolian authorities responded in full force, declaring a state of emergency and deploying the police and the military to restore order in Ulaanbaatar.[5]

This post-election saga came as a surprise to many in Mongolia and abroad given the performance of Mongolia’s young democracy up to that point. Indeed, the Democratic Party’s accusations do not seem entirely substantiated: international election observers disagreed with any such allegations.[6]

It is likely that the main trigger of the violence was not anything to do with the election dispute but rather the poor economic condition of Mongolia, with the election dispute acting as the catalyst for unleashing such frustration. Given the state of Mongolia’s economy, it is easy to see where the frustration stems from. Less than 1% of Mongolia’s land is fit for farming,[7] most of it being barren steppe and desert, forcing its people to herd animals for food (which, indeed, has been going on ever since Mongolia has been inhabited by people). While deeply rooted in tradition, such a nomadic lifestyle is unforgiving, which has prompted many to move to the cities, particularly Ulaanbaatar. Often, though, they end up in shantytowns outside the city, having exchanged one life of poverty for another.[8]

The lack of infrastructure across the vast steppes and deserts has remained a hindrance to further economic development. Although the former Communist rulers sought to modernize Mongolia and did have some impact, there is still less than 2,000 km of paved roads in Mongolia, which has an area about the size of Alaska.[9]

Mongolia hopes that its saving grace can be its vast, largely untapped deposits of minerals such as copper, gold, and coal. Unfortunately, the government has had a hard time regulating its nascent mining industry, and foreign companies still see most of the profits. Only a few Mongols reap the benefits while much of the rest of the Mongols remain poor.[10]

Perhaps the most telling example of the public frustration over the mining industry and the government’s inability to effectively regulate such mining is a 2006 windfall tax passed by the Mongolian parliament that would tax gold and copper profits at up to 68%. The Mongolian parliament passed this sweeping law in response to popular dissatisfaction with the foreign mining companies culminating in the burning of an effigy of Robert Friedland, then the head of Ivanhoe Mines Ltd, during a popular protest. The Mongolian government hoped that the new tax would enable the Mongolian people to profit more off of the gold and copper mining that has been undertaken by foreign companies.[11]

Unfortunately, the move seems to have backfired, partly because of the poor timing and execution of the Mongolian parliament: the tax was proposed and then enacted so swiftly that the mining companies had virtually no time to adjust, which alienated many and drove them away from current and future investment in Mongolia’s mines. Those that did stay had to rework contracts and delay new investments so that they could compensate financially for the sudden taxing change. The drop in mining from the foreign companies ultimately offset the higher tax rate, causing Mongolia’s revenue to decrease.[12]

Although not very well received by the public, Mongolia has had to rely on such foreign investment for a long while given its barren soil, harsh climate, its lack of development, and other economic handicaps. Such foreign aid dates back to the days of the Cold War when the Communist government in Mongolia received aid from the Soviet Union: indeed in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War the Mongolian economy fell on hard times after the Soviet aid stopped flowing into the country.[13] In recent years, other foreign companies and governments, particularly those of the United States, Japan, and China, have filled the void left by the Soviets.

Indeed, China has become perhaps the most important trading partner of Mongolia in recent years. The raw resources of Mongolia have helped China sustain its surging economic growth, while Chinese manufacturing and agricultural products have found a needy market back in Mongolia.[14]

The continued hardships of Mongolia’s economy have yet to translate into a change from democracy to another political system. That does not mean that there have not been grumblings, though. Some people long for the sort of socialist welfare programs that existed in the Communist regime but have since fallen out of favor since the introduction of capitalism and democracy.[15] Last month’s violence in Ulaanbaatar was a troubling sign of such dissatisfaction that the Mongols have with their daily lives. If the lives of the Mongols do not start to show signs of improvement soon, it may lead to a desire to try another form of government. It is such popular dissatisfaction with their lives rather than corruption or allegations of election fraud that the United States and other proponents of democracy should be most worried about with regard to Mongolia.

It is in the hands of the Mongol leaders, then, to help improve the state of the Mongol people to ensure their own success – and the success of the political system they head. In turns of immediate action, instituting some of the welfare policies that Mongolia is lacking may not be such a bad idea if for no other purpose than to alleviate some of the poverty.

Economically, greater regulation of mining and other industries would be a good move for the government so as to instill confidence in investors and to maximize output in such industries. Too much foreign investment may be unpopular and harmful in the long run, but at the moment it may be a necessary evil for Mongolia so as to generate some sort of economic activity. In the meantime, the government should focus on building up the country’s infrastructure and education systems so as to create a solid foundation from which Mongolian society may one day be able to sustain itself more through its own businesses as opposed to foreign ones.

If the Mongolian government implements such measures and continues to uphold its democratic form, then perhaps the Mongols will not erupt into an angry mob at the slightest bit of strain. Perhaps the Mongols will have lasting faith in their government. Perhaps the Mongols will look forward to the future rather than to seek solace in the past.

With democracy and established democratic nations faltering somewhat worldwide, whether it be the chaos in Iraq or Russia’s sound defeat of Georgia, never more has the fate of Mongolia meant so much for the United States and for the spread of democracy in general.

[1] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6252741.stm
[2] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mg.html
[3] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mg.html
[4] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6252741.stm
[5] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/08/world/asia/08mongolia.html
[6] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/08/world/asia/08mongolia.html
[7] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mg.html
[8] http://www.amurtmongolia.org/
[9] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mg.html
[10] http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2008/07/200873104041725239.html
[11] http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2008/07/200873104041725239.html
[12] http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2008/07/200873104041725239.html
[13] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2779.htm
[14] http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B02E1D8123BF93AA35754C0A9629C8B63&scp=3&sq=Mongolia&st=cse
[15] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6252741.stm

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A Lengthy Analysis of China: Introduction

Post 1 of an 11 part essay on how the recent unrest in Tibet is a barometer of the various internal issues and the international pressure that China is struggling to deal with.

The new reality over the past few decades has been the resurgence of China on the world stage. Spurred by rapid economic growth, China’s commercial and political actions have become some of the dominant factors shaping the world today, elevating China back towards the powerful, influential position it has been in for most of human history.

But even as China’s growing economic and political clout has enabled it to start to reemerge as a world power, several important domestic issues continue to deter and distort China’s development. The recent upheaval in Tibet is just the latest indicator of the internal challenges that China must face before it can complete its reemergence. In fact, the tumultuous situation in Tibet is an accumulation of a number of these internal problems, in particular China’s territorial and sovereignty disputes, the condescending attitude of the Han Chinese towards other ethnicities, the unregulated and imbalanced Chinese economy, and the Chinese government’s autocratic rule.

In addition, as China’s influence continues to grow, so will the various pressures it will face from the international community as it adjusts and reacts to the effects of not only China’s economic and political might, but also of its internal issues.

Truly, China has not fully reemerged quite yet. How China deals with the growing international scrutiny as well as with its internal issues, such as those that have antagonized the situation in Tibet, will determine just what kind of power China develops into.

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A Lengthy Analysis of China: Origins and Early History of the Tibet and Xinjiang Disputes

Post 2 of an 11 part essay on how the recent unrest in Tibet is a barometer of the various internal issues and the international pressure that China is struggling to deal with.

Fundamentally, the problematic situation in Tibet is a result of long-standing territorial disputes within China, particularly with regards to Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and Xinjiang. In these remote, non-Chinese regions, cultural and nationalist pride have presented significant challenges to a Chinese rule that in these areas remains distinctly foreign. Indeed, contrary to Chinese claims that these areas are “inseparable” parts of China, Tibet and East Turkistan, as the native Uyghurs call it, have been independent of Chinese rule for most of history and at times have even built empires that have rivaled China itself.

China’s first enduring control over these regions, and perhaps the true basis of present-day China’s claim to them, came as a result of the conquests of the last imperial dynasty of China, the Qing (who, incidentally, were of Manchu, and not Chinese, lineage, though by this time the Manchus were fairly sinified). At its height, after nearly a century of expansionism, the Qing ruled an empire encompassing not only traditional China, but also Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Korea, and parts of present-day Russia as well as compelled tribute from neighboring Vietnam, Burma, and Nepal.[1]

Although the Chinese had made some past forays into parts of Central Asia and other non-Chinese areas, they never before had ruled over a multicultural empire of such huge size. Like the Russians, the Ottomans, and the rulers of other multinational empires, the Qing were faced with a critical decision in how to govern their foreign lands: whether to try to exercise direct control over them and risk breeding more determined resistance in such areas or to grant them a degree of autonomy and risk undermining central authority in general.

At the outset, the Qing rulers granted a great deal of autonomy to such areas, making Tibet[2] and Korea[3] protectorates but essentially letting them govern themselves and exercising only very loose control over Xinjiang[4] and Mongolia.[5] The Qing reasoned, wisely, that to risk antagonizing such areas by enforcing direct rule would be pointless and imprudent given how hard it already was for them to administer and police their vast empire and to establish their credibility in China itself (so that the Chinese would be content to be ruled by the foreign Manchus).

As the Qing Dynasty began to reel in its waning years under internal rebellions and European and Japanese imperialism, it started to exert greater control over Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia for the first time. Only a few years after finally suppressing the long, bloody Muslim Rebellion in the west, Qing troops occupied Xinjiang in 1884 and put it under direct Chinese rule: in fact, it was then that the Qing named the region Xinjiang, meaning “new territory,” which implies that the Qing never before had considered the region a true part of China.[6] After a small British force invaded Tibet from India in 1904, the angry Qing government officially proclaimed to the British that China had sole sovereignty over Tibet, and in 1910 Qing troops enforced this statement by marching into Tibet and establishing direct Chinese rule.[7] Increasingly fearful of Russian influence in the north, particularly after the Russians occupied Manchuria during the Boxer Rebellion, the Qing drastically tightened their rule over Inner and Outer Mongolia and increasingly tried to sinify these areas.[8] Indeed, it is even possible that Korea might have also been subject to greater rule had it not come under the influence of and later the rule of Japan in 1895 and 1910, respectively.

The unprecedented Chinese control in these regions would prove short-lived, though, when just a few years later, in 1912, the Qing Dynasty was overthrown. The disintegration of the Qing government left the former empire without a strong central authority, and so central Chinese control in far-flung domains like Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia virtually ended. Indeed, there was no central Chinese control in China itself, as regional warlords and factions fought each other for power and plunged China into chaos.

For the next 40 years, with China embroiled in civil war and ravaged by recurrent Japanese invasions, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia came to fend for and govern for themselves. In Tibet, the Dalai Lama and his administration would rule undisturbed for much of the period.[9] In Xinjiang, the Uyghurs resisted invasions by frontier warlords and twice established an independent East Turkistan Republic.[10] In Outer Mongolia, the Mongols, with Tsarist support, declared their independence in 1911 and later, with Soviet support, would repel invasions from both the White Russians and the Chinese.[11]

For Tibet and East Turkistan, though, this period of self-rule would also prove short-lived. In 1949, the Communists finally eliminated the last of their rivals, the Guomindang (Nationalists), and gained control of China proper. With traditional China finally reunified under their direction, the Communists set about retaking the lands of the former Qing Empire, and by the early 1950s Communist troops had occupied Tibet and East Turkistan to bring back Chinese rule for good. Only the strong presence of the Soviet Union kept Mongolia from a similar fate (although, far from complete self-rule, it was more or less a Soviet satellite state until the 1990s).

Once again ruling over many nationalities, China once again had to decide whether to directly rule Tibet and Xinjiang or grant them a degree of autonomy. At this critical juncture, the Chinese government picked up right where the late Qing left off and asserted itself in full force over these territories, crushing the various uprisings and incorporating these regions as “autonomous” provinces in which Chinese officials, not Tibetan or Uyghur, had ultimate power. Still consolidating its rule throughout all of China, the Communists likely felt that granting any sort of true autonomy at this time would have undercut its authority in other places.

[1] http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/110832/Qianlong/1318/Dynastic-achievements#ref=ref3567&tab=active~checked%2Citems~checked&title=Qianlong%20%3A%3A%20Dynastic%20achievements%20--%20Britannica%20Online%20Encyclopedia
[2] http://www.cwru.edu/affil/tibet/documents/DragonandSnowLion.pdf
[3] http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/693609/history-of-Korea#tab=active~checked%2Citems~checked&title=history%20of%20Korea%20--%20Britannica%20Online%20Encyclopedia
[4] http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/index.htm
[5] Kotkin, Stephen, and Bruce A. Elleman. Mongolia in the Twentieth Century. N.p.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.
[6] http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/index.htm
[7] http://www.cwru.edu/affil/tibet/documents/DragonandSnowLion.pdf
[8] Kotkin, Stephen, and Bruce A. Elleman. Mongolia in the Twentieth Century. N.p.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.
[9] http://www.cwru.edu/affil/tibet/documents/DragonandSnowLion.pdf
[10] http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/china401/facts.html
[11] Kotkin, Stephen, and Bruce A. Elleman. Mongolia in the Twentieth Century. N.p.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.

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A Lengthy Analysis of China: Tibet and Xinjiang under Communist Rule

Post 3 of an 11 part essay on how the recent unrest in Tibet is a barometer of the various internal issues and the international pressure that China is struggling to deal with.

As time went on, successive uprisings, such as the latest riots in Tibet, have only led the government to tighten its grip on these so-called “autonomous” regions. Like elsewhere in China, the Communist government has consistently throughout its 60 year reign made heavy use of the military and the police (and little use of human rights) to forcibly suppress unrest and eliminate any sort of challenge to its rule. In addition, the government has made full use of its control over the media to carry out propaganda campaigns aimed at encouraging loyalty towards China and away from “separatists,” the collective term for any sort of opposition, violent or peaceful, to Chinese rule and policies in these areas.[1][2]

Over the years, China has also used some more unconventional methods to enforce order. In Xinjiang, for example, the Uyghurs allege that the Chinese have performed nuclear tests in Xinjiang and have forced Uyghur women to have abortions in an effort to reduce the Uyghur population,[3] and in the wake of 9/11, the Chinese government was even able to get the international community to brand Uyghur “separatists” as “terrorists” in an attempt to legitimize their crackdowns in the region.[4]

Not only has the Chinese government forcibly kept the Tibetans and Uyghurs in line, but it has also instituted policies aimed at assimilating them into Chinese culture at the expense of their traditional cultures in much the same way that the Qing incorporated Inner Mongolia a century earlier. In particular, the Chinese have striven to undermine one of the most critical aspects of Tibetan and Uyghur culture: religion. In Tibet, the Chinese government has arrested a significant number of Buddhist monks and has forced the monasteries to teach “patriotic education” classes to their monks.[5] In an even more blatant attempt at controlling Tibetan Buddhism, the Chinese recently handpicked the new Panchen Lama and arrested the boy who the Tibetan monks had determined to be the true Panchen Lama.[6] In Xinjiang, the Chinese government has targeted Islam, widely practiced by the Uyghurs, as a source of separatist sentiments. Using this as justification, the Chinese government has required imams to take patriotic strengthening classes similar to those imposed on Tibetan monks, and it has forbidden any expression of religion in Uyghur schools. The Chinese government has even gone so far as to dictate what version of the Koran may be used and where religious practices may be held.[7]

As they suppress religion and other aspects of indigenous culture, the Chinese government has encouraged Han Chinese migration to Tibet and Xinjiang in an effort to literally remake these areas into Chinese regions with Chinese culture. Spurred on by economic incentives offered by the Chinese government, growing Han immigration to these areas has significantly diluted the regional population: in 2005, for example, Han Chinese made up 41% of Xinjiang while Uyghurs made up 47% (by comparison, in 1949 a little under 5% of Xinjiang was Han Chinese while over 90% was Uyghur).[8] With this influx of Chinese comes an influx of Chinese culture, which is further eroding the traditional Tibetan and Uyghur cultures. Although, as the Chinese are quick to point out, such migration has also instigated economic activity in these regions, the Han have been the main beneficiaries of such commerce, which has only added to the resentment felt by the Tibetans and Uyghurs towards their Chinese overlords. As Han Chinese, Han prosperity, and Han culture continue to infiltrate Tibet and Xinjiang, the Han Chinese government has been able to argue on more and more grounds that these territories should indeed belong to China. Should these trends continue, and should aspects of Tibetan and Uyghur culture, such as religion, continue to weaken, these regions may indeed lose their ethnic and cultural identities, like Inner Mongolia largely did under the late Qing Dynasty, and then China’s arguments would indeed prove true.

As has happened in countless other multinational empires in history, though, China’s direct, authoritative rule over Tibet and Xinjiang has indeed caused more determined resistance in such areas. Although it has brought some economic activity and immediate order, China’s autocratic rule has ultimately strengthened the very separatist sentiments it has worked so painstakingly to suppress. Centuries of distinctness from Chinese sovereignty and culture laid a strong foundation for such sentiments to begin with in Tibet and Xinjiang, which the strong imposition of Chinese rule has only reinforced. In addition, the successful independence of Mongolia and the later independence of the other Central Asian states after the collapse of the Soviet Union have given even more momentum to calls for Tibetan and Uyghur independence.

More fundamentally, though, the controlling, intrusive style of Chinese rule has made many Tibetans and Uyghurs equate independence with preserving their ethnic identity and way of life. With Chinese actions encroaching into religion, education, and other aspects of daily life, clearly the current Chinese policies must be changed in order to preserve Tibetan and Uyghur culture. With no peaceful means of changing such policies and with no sign that the current Chinese government will relent, let alone grant true autonomy, independence increasingly seems the only practical solution for the Tibetans and Uyghurs.

This reality will inexorably continue to breed unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang, which will continue to destabilize these regions and hamper their ability to prosper, weakening China domestically. Furthermore, such upheaval will doubtlessly continue to sap the money and will of the Chinese government even as more pressing problems loom on the horizon.

Internationally, the Tibetans and the Uyghurs have and will continue to garner sympathy: in the wake of the recent Tibetan crackdown, for example, pro-Tibetan rallies sprung up throughout towns in India[9] and Nepal,[10] bringing the crushing weight of the Tibetan crisis on the villages they march in. In addition, China faces a stream of international scrutiny for their repressive crackdowns against the Tibetans and Uyghurs, not the least from pro-Tibetan and human rights groups that have harassed the Olympic torch on its journey to Beijing. Truly, China’s authoritative, controlling rule over the non-Chinese regions of Tibet and Xinjiang has been and will continue to be a great obstacle to China’s development, both internally and externally.

[1] http://www.cwru.edu/affil/tibet/documents/DragonandSnowLion.pdf
[2] http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/index.htm
[3] http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/archives/1999/10/14/0000006433
[4] http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/index.htm
[5] http://savetibet.org/tibet/index.php
[6] http://www.savetibet.org/campaigns/pl/index.php
[7] http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/index.htm
[8] http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/china401/facts.html
[9] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/18/world/asia/18exiles.html
[10]http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/asiapacific/features/article_1397349.php/In_photos_Nepal_Tibetan_Protests

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A Lengthy Analysis of China: The Status of Taiwan Part 1

Post 4 of an 11 part essay on how the recent unrest in Tibet is a barometer of the various internal issues and the international pressure that China is struggling to deal with.

In addition to Tibet and Xinjiang, another, somewhat more complicated territorial dispute involving sovereignty over Taiwan has been a tremendous burden for China, particularly internationally, where it has been one of the most sensitive global foreign policy issues of the last 60 years.

Like Tibet and Xinjiang and, for that matter, Outer Mongolia, Taiwan is a domain of the former Qing Empire that modern China sought to reestablish control over. Unlike with the others, though, Communist China sought Taiwan less out of a desire to reassert Chinese control over its former empire and more out of a desire to cement its own control in the Chinese heartlands: the last of its Guomindang (Nationalist) adversaries in the Chinese Civil War, led by Chiang Kai-Shek, fled to Taiwan with the remnants of the Republic of China (ROC) (the government that officially succeeded the Qing in 1912 and that had been dominated by the Guomindang since the 1930s) after losing control of mainland China. Thus, the new People’s Republic of China (PRC) (the government that the Communists established after the flight of the ROC) desired to conquer Taiwan and the ROC, which, despite its desperate situation, still claimed all of China as under their rule, in order to put a final end to the Chinese Civil War and eliminate all doubt as to who was the true master of China.

The international politics of the time, though, would prevent the PRC from bringing closure to the Chinese Civil War. Consistent with its newly established containment policy, the United States supported the Guomindang even before Chiang’s flight in order to deter the further spread of Communism. After Chiang’s retreat across the Taiwan straits, the United States continued to back Chiang and the ROC, refusing to recognize the PRC and providing military and economic aid to Taiwan so as to strengthen it in the event of a Communist invasion.

For the first few decades after Chiang’s retreat, such an invasion seemed imminent. Emboldened by the U.S. support, Chiang fortified Taiwan and other surrounding islands under ROC control, while the PRC, not yet relenting just because of the opposition of the United States, responded by bombarding Chiang’s fortifications, particularly those near mainland China’s coast. Several thousands of soldiers on each side died in these skirmishes, and indeed the Chinese Civil War seemed to have resumed.

Fearing what seemed like an inevitable Communist invasion of Taiwan, the United States took its commitment to the ROC to the next step, signing a mutual defense treaty with the ROC in which the United States pledged to come to Taiwan’s aid militarily in the event of a Communist invasion and threatening the PRC with a nuclear strike if it continued to shell ROC islands.

With the possibility of all-out, nuclear war with the United States looming, the PRC finally backed down, and by the 1960s it had ceased shelling ROC islands (aside from the propaganda leaflets that both sides continued to launch at each other throughout the 1960s and 1970s). For its part, the ROC, realizing that the United States would only commit troops to a defense of Taiwan and recognizing the growing military might of the PRC, would also eventually back down and abandon any serious plans to reconquer the Chinese mainland.

Although this reluctant, somewhat forced stalemate would end direct military confrontation between the two sides (as of now), it would not precipitate a resolution to the conflict. Rather, the dispute over Taiwan would evolve into its own little cold war within the Cold War. The PRC, while not invading Taiwan, still claimed the island, and the ROC would not formally renounce its claim over the entire Qing Empire. Both sides continued to build up their military, with the ROC even trying to build nuclear weapons to match those of the PRC.

Diplomatically, the PRC strived to gain more international recognition as the legitimate government of China, trying to discredit the ROC claim of China with the fact that, with the stalemate, Communist rule over China was a fait accomplit. All the while, the ROC tried to hold on to its international recognition by appealing to fears of Communism in the West.

In fact, the dispute over Taiwan would become so deeply woven into the fabric of international and regional relations that it gained a life of its own, outlasting both the Chinese Civil War and the Cold War, making every effort on the part of both sides to progress and move on trickier and harder.

The ROC, for instance, began to stop focusing on retaking the mainland in the wake of the stalemate, particularly after the death of Chiang, for whom the recapture of the mainland that he had once been the preeminent ruler of became something of a personal quest. The next generation of the ROC acknowledged that Taiwan would be the only permanent domain of the ROC, and so they began to focus on developing the island. These efforts helped Taiwan develop a dynamic, market economy as well as a more democratic political system: a much different path from mainland China, whose economic restraints have only recently been loosened and whose political system remains decisively authoritarian. It would not be unreasonable, then, to suggest, as many people have, that the ROC is in fact the ruler of an independent Taiwan that is separate from the mainland.

To say such things, though, is highly controversial, and to act on such words would likely provoke the PRC into invading Taiwan. Although Taiwan has been de facto independent for nearly 60 years, its official status is still consistent with the One-China policy, which states that there is one China, of which both the mainland and Taiwan are a part. This policy is essentially the preservation of the outdated status quo of the Chinese Civil War, since, under the wording, both the PRC and the ROC could claim to be the rulers of this “one China.”

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A Lengthy Analysis of China: The Status of Taiwan Part 2

Post 5 of an 11 part essay on how the recent unrest in Tibet is a barometer of the various internal issues and the international pressure that China is struggling to deal with.

The One-China policy became a mainstay of international diplomacy as recognition of the PRC increased. Even for those nations who did not have a strong position on the Taiwan dispute and simply thought it illogical to ignore a government that effectively ruled over more than 1 billion people, the PRC made acceptance of the One-China policy by other countries a condition for opening relations with the said countries, which in effect means renouncing ties with the ROC, since in recognizing the PRC a country affirms that the PRC, and not the ROC, is the legitimate government of the “one China” that includes Taiwan and the other islands ruled by the ROC.

As a result of being trapped by this rhetoric, Taiwan has no representation in the United Nations (it used to hold the China seat, but in 1971 the ROC representatives were expelled in favor of those of the PRC) and is no longer recognized by the majority of the world. This nominally illegitimate status makes dealing with Taiwan fairly difficult, as it cannot be party to any international treaties nor can it be directly negotiated with without alienating the PRC.

Even as it denies the legitimacy of the ROC, though, the PRC has established some informal ties with Taiwan, particularly on economic and travel matters. In addition, other surrounding countries, such as Japan, have unofficial relations with Taiwan due to the stake they have in Taiwan’s economy.[1] Indeed, although the United States officially renounced the ROC in 1979 in favor of the PRC and nullified the defense treaty, it still maintained close informal relations with Taiwan and continued to furnish it with high-tech weaponry and military funding in order to discourage the PRC from a potential invasion.

In a way, the PRC probably would not mind if the complexities of Taiwan’s status could just be swept away, allowing for Taiwan to officially become an independent state. The PRC’s informal contacts with the island demonstrate the PRC’s acknowledgement of the benefits of cooperation between the two, and indeed an independent Taiwan would still pale in comparison to the rising China and would probably loosen Chinese tensions with the United States.

The PRC, though, is compelled to continue to claim Taiwan and ensure that Taiwan does not declare independence in order to maintain the image of its strong authority, both domestically and internationally. The PRC has struggled throughout its reign to maintain its authoritarian hold over the Chinese people in general and in particular over the non-Chinese, dissatisfied regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. Any step viewed as letting Taiwan act more like an independent state will be duly noted by the Chinese as well as the Tibetans and the Uyghurs who will in turn likely push for similar treatment. In addition, the PRC fears, reasonably so, that its international clout would be weakened if it gave in to calls for Taiwanese independence.

As ridiculous as the Taiwan situation may seem and as outdated as it may be, it continues to have real implications for China and the rest of the world. The PRC has sought to influence Taiwanese politics, helping politicians that advocate adhering to the One-China policy.[2] Those that advocate otherwise are met with a weakening of informal ties and, in some cases, renewed invasion threats. In fact, in 2005, the PRC passed a law officially legalizing its right to invade Taiwan if it declared independence. Even before this law, fears of an invasion compelled Europe and the United States to ban the exportation of high-tech equipment and weaponry to China.

In another recent incident from 1995-1996, the PRC fired missiles close to Taiwan and practiced military operations for an assault on Taiwan after the United States granted a visa to the Taiwanese president at the time, Lee Teng-hui. In response, the United States deployed several aircraft carriers groups in the Taiwan Straits, a clear demonstration that U.S. military support for Taiwan in the event of a PRC invasion has not been ruled out. One can only hope that a devastating, nuclear war between the United States and China over Taiwan will not become the most far-reaching consequence of the dispute over Taiwan.

Truly, the controversial situation regarding Taiwan has become nothing but a nuisance and a hindrance for China, Taiwan, and the rest of the world. Unlike China’s other territorial disputes and, for that matter, its other lingering issues, this dispute, due to the potential implications it has for Tibet, Xinjiang, and, more critically, war with the United States, may never really be fully solved but rather continue to evolve and be a thorn in the side for China as it tries to develop into a superpower.

[1] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm
[2] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/21/world/asia/21taiwan.html

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A Lengthy Analysis of China: The Condescending Han Attitude Towards Other Ethnic Groups and its Effects

Post 6 of an 11 part essay on how the recent unrest in Tibet is a barometer of the various internal issues and the international pressure that China is struggling to deal with.

On a certain level, the direct and far-reaching Chinese control over Tibet and Xinjiang has been driven not only by a desire to effectively rule such areas, but also by an underlying attitude of Han superiority over other ethnic groups – some would even call it racism – that, in its various forms, has stirred up ethnic tensions in Tibet and Xinjiang that have contributed to the tumult in such areas.

This condescending Chinese attitude is the culmination of centuries of historical dominance of Chinese civilization in East Asia. Being the first to become civilized in their part of Asia and developing in relative isolation from the other ancient forefather civilizations in India and the Middle East, the Chinese came to view themselves as the center of civilization – the Middle Kingdom – surrounded by a sea of uncivilized barbarians, which naturally made neighboring peoples inferior in Chinese eyes and also instilled the Chinese with the arrogant perception that they were the best in the world. Even now that classical Chinese civilization is no more and China itself is no longer the unquestioned superpower in East Asia, let alone the rest of the world, the Chinese still cling to their ancient pride and consequently look with contempt on neighboring peoples.

Given their stark cultural distinctness from China and the sensitivity of their political situation, the Tibetans and Uyghurs have become particular victims of this sinocentric attitude, and as more and more Han Chinese move into Tibet and Xinjiang, discrimination has become all the more commonplace, particularly in the economic environment. Since Han Chinese now own and operate most of the businesses in Tibet and Xinjiang, hiring and employment for high paying, management jobs have generally favored the Han at the expense of the Tibetans and Uyghurs, who have often had to settle for low income, labor-intensive jobs instead. This socioeconomic gap has consequently made it more difficult for Tibetans and Uyghurs to get access to high quality education, health care, and other services that are usually fairly expensive and are located in the cities as opposed to the countryside, where many Tibetans and Uyghurs live.[1][2] This gap has also made the Tibetans and Uyghurs as a whole seem poor and unskilled in Chinese eyes, only giving the Chinese another excuse to look down on them.

While such discrimination clearly happens in everyday interactions, the problem has most certainly been exacerbated by the actions of the Chinese government. Although it officially insists that ethnic discrimination exists “everywhere in the world except China,”[3] the Chinese government’s policies have in fact strengthened the very much existent ethnic tensions between the Han Chinese and the minority Tibetans and Uyghurs. Indeed, the element of Han supremacy seems to have greatly influenced the Han Chinese government’s policies towards Tibet and Xinjiang. The erosion of Tibetan and Uyghur culture, particularly religion, the widespread propaganda in the media and the schools, and the flood of Han Chinese people and customs[4] have done more than just enforce control, but have also worked to drown out Tibetan and Uyghur culture and supplant it with Chinese culture. This suggests that the Chinese government has a greater motive behind its policies than simply to control Tibet and Xinjiang, but to also impose on them what it views as the inherently superior Chinese way of life.

Some of its actions seem to show utter indifference to Tibetan or Uyghur well-being, such as the decision to conduct nuclear tests in Lop Nor in Xinjiang as opposed to a predominantly Han area, which seems eerily similar to the Soviet decision to conduct nuclear tests in the non-Russian region of Kazakhstan. Others, though, particularly those designed to assimilate the Tibetans and Uyghurs into Chinese culture, seem to reflect the idea that in a way, the Chinese government is helping these previously inferior areas by introducing them to Chinese culture. As Hu Jintao himself arrogantly remarked in 2001, “The peaceful liberation of Tibet... ushered in a new era in which Tibet would turn from darkness to light, from backwardness to progress, from poverty to affluence and from seclusion to openness.”[5] Indeed, there may be some truth behind this statement: for years, the now beloved lamas in Tibet wielded significant power in conjunction with local landholders over a mostly enserfed population.[6] But at least these leaders did not try to “liberate” the Tibetans from their cultural identity.

The various Tibetan and Uyghur uprisings, including the latest Tibetan riots, are surely in part a testament to the daily, de facto discrimination the Tibetans and Uyghurs face and the arrogant, sinocentric undercurrent that the Chinese governs them with. The Chinese government, though, clearly either does not understand this or does not care, as none of these uprisings have led them to root out feelings of Han superiority among everyday Chinese or among the Chinese government itself. In fact, during the latest Tibetan unrest, the Chinese government used the ethnic tensions to garner public support for the crackdown, using their control of China’s media outlets to constantly replay images and stories of Tibetan mobs killing, looting, and pillaging, and conveniently leaving out any mention of the harsh Chinese crackdown to follow.[7] What is truly discouraging, though, both for Tibet and for China, is that the propaganda seems to be working: many Chinese have cheered the crackdown and have posted anti-Tibetan remarks on Chinese internet forums.[8]

In choosing to promote such discrimination, China has only given the Tibetans and Uyghurs more of a reason to seek independence, since clearly under the current policies they will be looked down upon and disadvantaged and under the current political system they have no peaceful means of changing such policies. Putting down future uprisings will continue to be a challenging, costly enterprise for China and one which the rest of the world will likely frown upon as China resorts to more and more forceful methods to suppress them. In addition, such discrimination will divide the country and create social and economic turmoil that will hinder China’s ability to prosper. Truly, China’s prolonging of the discriminatory status quo will negatively affect its development, both internally and externally, towards becoming an accepted world power.

[1] http://chinaaid.org/2008/02/06/chinese-curbs-leave-uyghur-youth-in-crisis/
[2] http://www.savetibet.org/news/publications/jampa.php
[3] http://www.savetibet.org/news/publications/jampa.php
[4] See Tibet and Xinjiang under Communist Rule
[5] http://www.chinaembassycanada.org/eng/xwdt/t37288.htm
[6] www.michaelparenti.org/Tibet.html
[7]http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/20/world/asia/20tibet.html?_r=1&pagewanted=1&sq=China%20Tibet%20discrimination&st=nyt&scp=2&oref=slogin
[8] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/31/world/asia/31china.html

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A Lengthy Analysis of China: China's Unrestricted Economic Growth and its Effects

Post 7 of an 11 part essay on how the recent unrest in Tibet is a barometer of the various internal issues and the international pressure that China is struggling to deal with.

In addition to Tibet’s lack of autonomy and ethnic discrimination, the dissatisfaction of the Tibetans is also a result of the uneven economic growth that has been one of several unaccounted-for problems in China’s overall booming economy.

Even while mired in Mao Zedong’s backward Great Leap Forward – an agricultural and manufacturing collectivization plan – it should have been apparent that China and its more than 1 billion people were ripe to have a huge economic impact soon, comparable to the fundamental role it played in global trade throughout much of its pre-modern history. Doubtless, China has come a long way from Mao’s disastrous policies, and since pragmatists like Deng Xiaoping came to power, China has slowly, but surely, started to modernize and to loosen restraints on individual economic freedom, allowing the billions of Chinese to increase their entrepreneurial output and enter the modern economic fray.

Such economic activity has propelled the Chinese economy past even those of some of the long-standing industrial powerhouses, and, even as China’s full economic potential is yet to be realized, the world is already feeling the resounding effects of China’s resurgent economy. As more and more of the over 1 billion Chinese have started to enter modern economic life, they have consumed more and more needs like oil, natural gas, and electricity, which has further driven up the price and exhausted the supplies of such resources. These consumers have also become a new market for a variety of goods and services that foreign companies have been able to profit off of. Conversely, though, Chinese companies have become increasingly competitive with foreign companies in other countries with their ability to make mass amounts of cheap goods. With such investment abroad comes greater influence over client nations, particularly in many African countries, like Nigeria, that are becoming increasingly dominated by Chinese oil companies. The wealth generated by the increasingly dynamic economy has helped to swell the government’s coffers, enabling them to exercise new measures of power, such as loaning more and more money to the U.S. government.

As the recent Tibetan unrest has shown, though, not all of China has benefited from the economic boom. The rapid growth has largely been concentrated in China’s eastern seaboard in cities like Beijing and Shanghai. Much of inland China, like Tibet and Xinjiang, remains rural and poor. Bent on overall growth, the government has given inadequate attention to the growing differences in wealth between regions.

Moreover, the minimal attention it has given has mainly benefited the Han at the expense of minorities such as the Tibetans and Uyghurs: the mostly Han business owners typically hire more Han for the high paying, management jobs than minorities, perhaps for ethnic reasons, which forces most of the minorities to take up low income, laborious jobs instead. The difficulties faced by the Tibetans and Uyghurs due to this socioeconomic gap, particularly the trouble they have affording proper services, have only added to their resentment of the Chinese and their overall dissatisfaction.[1]

Although minorities have been hit the worst, even many Han have been victimized by the growing gap between the rich and the poor: more so than in other large economies, a great number of China’s employees work for modest pay at best doing labor intensive jobs while the business executives receive the bulk of the profits from the factories they run or the low-cost products they churn out (made possible by the cheap labor force).[2]

More ominous than the negligence of the economic imbalances has been the government’s negligence of the environment, which has not only damaged China’s environment, but has also contributed significantly to global warming. Unfiltered waste pours into China’s water bodies and is not always compensated by better filtration of potential drinking water. Carbon dioxide and other more harmful substances are emitted undeterred by Chinese factories, making the air intensely polluted and, in some cities, barely breathable.[3] Indeed, many are worried about the effect such air will have on the Olympic athletes that are set to compete in less than a week,[4] and some even blame the greenhouse gases for the increasing aridness of inland China.[5] Even as many criticize the United States for its lack of concern for global warming, the reality is that China’s deplorable environmental conditions more than offset any gains that United States initiative could bring about.

Like environmental standards, safety and quality product standards have been scarcely regulated, shunted aside by the desire for pure economic growth. Such poor quality is evident in recent scandals involving lead paint and chemical toxins present in children’s toys that were made in China.[6] The appalling quality of Chinese goods hurts its export economy, as countries like the United States have become increasingly cautious about purchasing such low-quality goods, despite their low price.

Ironically enough, the economic growth for which the Chinese have neglected to regulate and balance their economy is also proving more difficult to handle than perhaps previously thought: the steep increases in economic activity coupled with the economic slowdown in the United States and rising oil prices have caused sizeable inflation[7] in China that has begun to cause some concern.

Truly, even as China’s economic surge continues to have far-reaching effects, its deficiencies hamper China’s stability and development, as well as the entire environment.

[1] See Ethnic Discrimination
[2] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/21/AR2005092100727.html
[3] http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/world/asia/26china.html
[4] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/29/sports/olympics/29china.html?hp
[5] http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/world/asia/26china.html
[6] http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtml08/08164.html
[7] http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-07/23/content_6869002.htm

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A Lengthy Analysis of China: The Communists' Response to China's Internal Problems

Post 8 of an 11 part essay on how the recent unrest in Tibet is a barometer of the various internal issues and the international pressure that China is struggling to deal with.

China’s lingering internal issues would present significant challenges for even the most honest and able governments. The current Communist regime, though, as with other unpopular, unrepresentative governments, has put a priority on maintaining power in the short run, which has affected their handling of the various issues plaguing China and, in fact, has become another such hindrance to China’s development in the long run. Rather than confronting China’s problems objectively, the government has dealt with them in such a way to try to tighten its hold on power. Its response to the recent earthquake is a perfect example of this, with propaganda newsreels constantly replaying images of Chinese soldiers coming to the rescue[1] and of Premier Wen Jiabao consoling victims.[2]

The government’s handling of the Tibetan unrest and its causes is also consistent with this trend. Rather than to grant Tibet the kind of autonomy logically implied by its status as an autonomous region, the government has tightened its grip over the area to assert its own blunt authority over Tibet as well as China. Rather than to try to ease the ethnic tensions at the source of the Tibetans’ discontent, the government actively heightened such tensions to try to gain popular backing for its crackdown. Rather than to try to balance the growth that has brought poverty and stagnation to much of China, including Tibet, the government has not done enough to control the surging economic growth, afraid of stemming such growth altogether and alienating local officials and wealthy businessmen. Perhaps a more popular or representative government would be compelled to more objectively confront China’s internal problems for the good of the people, and for the good of China.

To be fair, though, the Chinese government has recognized the need to at least partially address the well-being of the nation itself, evident in its steady loosening of economic restraints. Such reforms, though, would not have been enacted if the government had not thought they would benefit in some way. Indeed, the increased economic activity generated as result of such actions has substantially increased the government’s tax revenue, and the growing international clout of China due to its economic rise has in turn translated into the Chinese government’s growing influence over the rest of the world. Such moves were also carried out with the hope of appeasing the public with greater economic freedom and prosperity while at the same time stopping short of allowing enough civil liberties, criticism, or opposition to threaten the government’s power.

In the wake of economic growth and modernization, though, the Communists are finding it harder and harder to maintain their grip on power. The economic reforms, although satisfying some people, have made others, such as minorities, more dissatisfied. As more and more people experience economic freedom, they in turn wonder about political freedom as well. As more and more international companies do business with China, the Western political ideals they bring further whet the appetite of democracy in many Chinese. In the face of such renewed pressure, the government, like it has in similar situations in the past, particularly the infamous Tiananmen Square incident, has clamped down ever harder on real and perceived threats to its rule. As the latest response to the Tibetan unrest shows, the government is resorting to more and more heavy-handed means of enforcing its power, from military deployment and propaganda to its inhumane tactics and the jailing of human rights activists that condemn them.[3] Indeed, it is likely that the Communists have put renewed emphasis on reigning in Tibet and Xinjiang in order to demonstrate the might of their authority to the rest of China.

Even as the central government’s grip on the people loosens, though, so does its grip over its own officials. The once centralized party apparatus has steadily become more and more decentralized since the death of Mao Zedong to the point where now the power and discretion exercised by local officials has grown significant, making it that much harder for the government to agree on and address domestic issues uniformly.

As the embattled Communist government struggles to stay afloat, it is becoming more and more of an obstacle to China’s development into a world power. Subjecting the handling of China’s problems to the desire to maintain power will doubtless leave them inadequately solved or worsened, allowing them to continue to distort and hinder China’s development. Subjecting the Chinese people to such authoritarian and self-serving measures will doubtless continue to cause more internal turmoil and popular dissatisfaction. Outside China’s borders, the government’s actions have and will continue to be the subject of international scrutiny and subsequent consequences. China’s poor human rights record has long been condemned by the rest of the world, particularly the West, damaging Chinese credibility. Restrictions on civil liberties, particularly freedom of expression, have made it harder for foreign companies to do business in China, since they are reluctant about having their businesses restricted or even used by the government as it tries to maintain its hold over the restless population.[4] Truly, the autocratic rule of the Chinese government is a hindrance for China, both internally and externally.

[1] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/2016887/China-earthquake-Beijing-seizes-on-rescue-for-Olympic-propaganda.html
[2] http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displayStory.cfm?source=hptextfeature&story_id=11541327
[3] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/04/world/asia/04china.html
[4] http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jan2006/nf20060113_6735_db053.htm

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A Lengthy Analysis of China: Past and Present International Attitudes towards China

Post 9 of an 11 part essay on how the recent unrest in Tibet is a barometer of the various internal issues and the international pressure that China is struggling to deal with.

With its economy continuing to experience rapid growth, China’s international presence and influence has become harder and harder to ignore, which has caused an increase in international action and attention directed towards the developing superpower. China’s burgeoning economy is creating huge influxes in the world markets – with cheap Chinese goods outselling those of previous providers and a sharp increase in Chinese consumption of oil and other resources significantly affecting the worldwide demand and price of such resources – that the rest of the world is having to adjust to. In addition to China’s prosperity, though, the rest of the world has also felt the affects of China’s lack of economic oversight that has caused global environmental damage and has allowed low quality, and even dangerous products to be produced and shipped to unsuspecting nations.

In addition to and, in a way, by virtue of its economy, China’s territorial issues have also had affects beyond China’s borders that the international community has had to react to. The disputes over Tibet and Xinjiang have been an obstacle to further Chinese stability and development that have affected Chinese production and, by extension, world markets. In addition, the Tibetan and Uyghur struggles have garnered popular sympathy around the world, particularly in countries such as India and Nepal that have significant Tibetan or Uyghur populations, which has encouraged the leaders of such nations to address the disputes over Tibet and Xinjiang. The harsh methods utilized by the Chinese in such regions and their neglect of human rights have generated further popular outrage around the world, which has compelled various nations, such as the United States, to denounce such actions and take them into consideration when dealing with the Chinese. Against the backdrop of China’s booming economy and growing clout, the stakes of such considerations are considerably raised.

In addition, the controversial status of Taiwan continues to be a sensitive issue that China and the rest of the world have to tread lightly around, and indeed continued fears of a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan coupled with its ruthless suppression of unrest in the infamous Tiananmen Square incident have led the European Union and the United States to ban the exportation of arms and high-tech equipment to China, hoping that China will not be so willing to flaunt its large military so long as it has outdated weaponry.

All things considered, the international community clearly has had good reason to respond to and apply pressure on China.

China is no stranger to international attention: indeed, for most of human history, China has attracted the notice and fascination of much of the world. As early as Roman times, Chinese commodities, such as silk and ceramics, were in high demand across the known world. In the time of the Mongol Empire, Chinese goods were spread more thoroughly than ever across the globe, with its prized merchandise and inventions, such as the compass and gunpowder, attracting particular interest from Europe: indeed, finding a direct trade route to such products (one that did not involve the Ottoman Empire as the middleman) was one of Western Europe’s key motives for sending out naval expeditions that were the precursor to the Western colonial empires.

For the most part, though, China has been relatively indifferent or oblivious to the attention it received and the progress of the rest of the world. In their arrogance, the Chinese saw no point in reaching out to other civilizations while they were scrambling to come to China itself to trade. Furthermore, the Chinese felt that there was no need to pay attention to developments in the rest of the world, since no civilization could match that of China’s (or so they believed). Therefore, the main goal was to repel invaders from Central Asia that sought to destroy China’s remarkable civilization; events outside Central Asia were of minimal importance.

The events of the 19th century would finally make the Chinese realize the importance of paying attention to and responding to the events and actions of the rest of the world. China’s rout at the hands of Britain in the Opium War and several subsequent conflicts with the West demonstrated just how far behind the Europeans China had fallen as a result of not keeping up with international activities and progress. These defeats would lead to the European and Japanese domination of China until the mid 20th century. The Chinese would not forget the price they paid for their ignorance and isolation, finally resolving to deal with and respond to other nations more seriously than before.

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A Lengthy Analysis of China: How China Should Deal with Foreign Pressure

Post 10 of an 11 part essay on how the recent unrest in Tibet is a barometer of the various internal issues and the international pressure that China is struggling to deal with.

In determining its response to the current pressure, China will have to carefully weigh its interests and its pride as well as the consequences of compliance or defiance of international demands. Cooperating with the rest of the world would likely make other countries more comfortable about associating with Chinese businesses and policies, and it would surely make China itself more credible to other nations, perhaps leading them to more readily acknowledge China’s viability. China has clearly taken some steps in this direction, agreeing to some concessions with regards to Taiwan (not invading it, allowing it to govern itself) and wooing the international community so as to become the host country of the upcoming 2008 Summer Olympics, the event that China hopes will signal its return to world prominence.

The government has become obsessed with performing well in the games, going so far as to order the Houston Rockets of the NBA to sideline star Chinese center Yao Ming for the season after his injury so that he would be well in time to play for Team China at the Olympics.[1] The government has been equally obsessed with ensuring that the rest of the world takes part in the Olympics, trying to act carefully so as not to alienate other nations and prompt them to boycott the games in retaliation. This may partially explain why the Chinese police initially hesitated to quell the Tibetan riots.[2] In addition, the government has taken drastic measures to embellish Beijing and the overall Olympic environment for the upcoming athletes. Among other things, in Beijing the government has closed several factories and prevented several streets from being driven on in a desperate attempt to limit the appalling amount of pollution hovering over the capital,[3] and in one extreme case the government walled off several houses so as to beautify the square for the upcoming games.[4]

While some cooperation is undoubtedly good, complying too much with international demands could cause unwanted interference in China’s domestic issues (although they do have international effects) and could hurt the aims of China given that their stances on certain situations, such as those regarding Taiwan and Africa, differ markedly from international stances on them. Equally critical, agreeing too much to international wishes would recall the dreadful memories of European imperialist control and Japanese occupation that China never wants to remotely experience again. Although the past European and Japanese incursions humbled the Chinese into dealing with the rest of the world, they did not cause the Chinese to relinquish their proud attitude. True to such pride, China wants to deal with its issues its way.

Ever since China was finally reunified under Communist rule, China has leaned far more towards defiance than compliance with the rest of the world. It countered the Americans during the Korean War, occupied part of disputed Kashmir, checked the power of and even skirmished with the Soviet Union, threatened Taiwan, and fought a border war with Vietnam, among other things, clearly demonstrating its willingness to use aggressive foreign policy actions with only secondary regard to the views of other countries. Such a trend has continued to the present day, with China increasingly undercutting American diplomatic actions towards Darfur and Iran and also selling arms to regimes such as those in Zimbabwe and Sudan whose actions are denounced by most of the rest of the world, to name a few examples.

Moreover, China continues to largely ignore the rest of the world when acting on its core issues, as the response to the latest Tibetan unrest shows. Even with outside influence at its zenith with the Olympics nearing, ultimately China did not hesitate to brutally suppress the unrest, sending a clear message that its internal issues, like Tibet, are more important than international aims or acceptance.

It may not be altogether wise, though, for China to take such a unilateral, defiant stance towards the rest of the world. Even as China affects the outside world, so do other countries influence China as well. China’s technological and weaponry deprivation due to the U.S. and European embargoes is a clear example of the direct impact that the outside world can have on China’s development and power. In addition, as dynamic as China’s economy is, it does rely heavily on foreign markets for the sale of its low cost products and the importation of several necessary resources, like oil, and it would not be inconceivable if countries like the United States stopped importing Chinese goods or if resource-rich countries stopped exporting their raw materials. Although this would have a recoil effect on the acting countries, it nevertheless is a possibility the Chinese would do well to be aware of. As international pressure continues to mount, China must seek to balance independence and cooperation, interests and pride, and the eventual formula may very well end up defining China’s role as a world power.

[1] http://shakedownsports.com/2008/02/27/yao-mings-stress-fracture-conspiracy/
[2] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/24/world/asia/24tibet.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&oref=slogin
[3] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/01/sports/olympics/01china.html?hp
[4] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/29/sports/olympics/29beijing.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss

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A Lengthy Analysis of China: Conclusion

Post 11 of an 11 part essay on how the recent unrest in Tibet is a barometer of the various internal issues and the international pressure that China is struggling to deal with.

The next few years, maybe even decades, will be very critical times for determining China’s future. As China finally starts to realize its full economic and international potential, it will become more and more of a force to be reckoned with. Various issues still remain, though, from the bitter regional disputes, the strong discriminatory currents, and the lack of economic balance and regulation to the self-serving government and the increasing international pressure. In handling the latest upheaval in Tibet, China moved in a distinct direction with regards to each of these issues. Subsequent incidents of some sort, whether in Tibet or elsewhere, will likely occur throughout the next few years where the government will again have to make decisions regarding China’s lingering issues. China’s eventual position on these issues will ultimately shape China’s internal development and, through its growing influence, global affairs as well.

Amidst involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of its preoccupation on its “war on terror,” the United States would do well not to forget that state to state politics still dominate and shape the international environment far more than a few extremists groups ever could. And with the 20th century fading into the past, China is showing the potential to have a far greater power and impact on the United States than any other state. The United States, then, would do well to place a priority on relations with China as well as to monitor the events within China, for China’s reaction to such events, more so than anything else, will determine just what kind of a reality China will bring to the 21st century.

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Why Russia Will Remain Russia

As Russia reemerges from the shadow of the iron curtain, many in America are disappointed by what they see as a lack of success in the former Soviet Republic. Although Communism has been eradicated, democracy and capitalism have still yet to find fertile ground in Russia’s harsh soil. In addition, despite the ultimate triumph of the United States over the USSR, Russia continues to profoundly shape international issues across the globe, often to the detriment of U.S. interests.

While the state of Russia may be frustrating, it should not be surprising. The traits Russia is exhibiting are continuations of not just the Soviet era, but also, in essence, of the entire history of Russia. Whether under the tsars, the Bolsheviks, or United Russia (Vladimir Putin’s political party), and whether operating an agrarian, socialist or free market economy, certain distinct Russian characteristics have persisted and continue to define a unique Russia.

This singular entity has, for most of its history, been dominated by the single, overarching authority of the state and its leader. Mr. Putin and his purported puppet, Dmitry Medvedev, are simply the latest examples of a long tradition of autocratic, central rulers in Russia, from the tsars, like infamous Ivan the Terrible and cunning Catherine the Great, to the Communists, like merciless Stalin. Throughout Russian history, these heavy-handed rulers, not surprisingly, have met any opposition or threat to their rule with brutal retaliation. Ivan the Terrible is called so for a reason: he executed any boyars (nobles) that he suspected of disloyalty. Peter the Great harshly suppressed an army mutiny and even put his own son to death. Catherine the Great violently crushed the Pugachev Rebellion, personally executing Pugachev. Nicholas I brutally put down the Decembrists. Nicholas II ordered the army to open fire on protesters during the infamous Bloody Sunday massacre of the 1905 Revolution. Stalin utterly annihilated any real, suspected, or imaginary threats to his absolute power. Through forced starvations and gulag labor camps, among other things, Stalin was responsible for the deaths of 20-40 million people. The emergence of "democracy" in post-Soviet Russia has yet to bring about any relief for opponents of the government. While not to the same degree as the tsars, and certainly not Stalin, over the past eight years Putin and his United Russia have degraded and dealt with any opponents to their dominance of Russian politics. Putin and his party were especially intrusive in the months leading up to the elections: according to a recent New York Times article, Putin’s party cowed factory workers to vote for the party, manipulated the media to discredit the opposition, broke up opposition demonstrations, and even forcefully peopled Kremlin rallies. Under the veil of “democracy,” opposition, in one form or another, is still being forcibly subjugated in Russia.

The ability of Russian rulers to maintain their hold on power has been possible in no small part due to Russia’s longtime military orientation. Ever since being reborn in a long war against the Mongols and ever expanding in all directions, Russia has been in an almost perpetual state of war. As the military grew and advanced to fuel the constant wars and expansion, they increasingly became an important component of the tsars’ hold on power. The increasingly able forces of the tsar were readily dispatched to suffocate internal unrest. Between the desire for empire and order, it is no wonder that Russia’s leaders geared Russian productivity towards the military. Peter the Great uprooted entire villages so that the people could staff the mines and factories that manufactured arms and ammunition (ironically enough, this was the most prominent example of any manufacturing in Russia for over 150 years). The Bolshevik revolution did not reverse this trend at all; indeed, the new regime put even more emphasis on the military and in particular armed the USSR with a formidable nuclear arsenal. Even today, the Russian military remains formidable – only four other countries have more active troops than Russia. Although no longer expanding Russia's border, this military has seen its fair share of action, particularly in Chechnya.

Even more potent than the important military has been the secret police. The brainchild of none other than Ivan the Terrible, some sort of secret police unit, from Ivan’s Oprichnina to the infamous KGB to Putin’s shady FSB, has stealthily eliminated enemies of the government, leaving in its wake an atmosphere of intense fear and distrust.

Abroad, due to in no small part to its military-centric society, Russia has wielded a heavy hand in foreign policy. As Russia steadily grew to become the largest land empire in modern times, it encountered a great many civilized nations and regions and soon began to interfere in their affairs. As it expanded into Eastern Europe to the coast of the Baltic Sea, Russia soon became a key European player, as European alliances and diplomacy increasingly factored in the growing power and influence of Russia. Inevitably, due to its growing intrusions into European affairs, Russia became involved in many of the major European wars, like the Napoleonic Wars and both World Wars, and even saw wars specifically directed at it, like the Crimean War. As the army pushed south, Russia repeatedly clashed with the Ottoman Empire, gaining a sizeable amount of land from the teetering Turkish state and eventually provoking the British to intervene to prevent Russia from extending its vast domains to the shores of the Mediterranean. As Russia expanded to the Pacific Ocean, Russia came in increasing contact with the Qing Empire and soon started to seize land and exert great control over the declining Chinese state. Later, Russia came in conflict with the newly emergent Japan, and openly clashed with it in the Russo-Japanese War. Following the overthrow of the tsars, the Soviet Union was one of the most heavy-handed, powerful entities in history with a vigorous foreign policy aimed at furthering territorial expansion, spreading Communism, and deterring its superpower rival, the United States. Even after the decline of the Soviet Union, Russia has yet to relinquish its aggressive foreign policy. Still mistrustful of the United States, Russia continues to antagonize America through actions such as shipping nuclear fuel to Iran, taking a half-hearted stance against Sudan's actions in Darfur, allegedly providing Sadaam Hussein with military intelligence reports on U.S. troop movements before the Iraq invasion, and claiming large sections of the polar ice cap. In addition, Russia continues to exert great influence over its former territorial domains, meddling in the affairs of Georgia and Ukraine as well as clamping down hard on Chechnya.

In addition to great social and political control, the Russian government has also historically had a significant role in the economy. Indeed, the state and boyar dominance over the enserfed Russians gave them almost absolute control over the largely agrarian economy in the pre-industrial years: they could control output through how brutally hard they pushed the peasants to farm the land and how many forced laborers they staffed the mines with. Peter the Great in particular was very adamant about this, forcing entire towns to become forced labor in the mines fueling Russia’s military industries. When it became clear that Russia needed to industrialize to keep pace with Europe, the state spearheaded the effort, since the tightly bound social hierarchy left little room for a middle class to emerge that could instigate economic activity. In this respect, Communism brought little drastic change, as the state took control over the few economic aspects that it had not already encompassed earlier. Even now, after the overthrow of the Communists, the state remains intimately involved in the economy. The oil and natural gas boom that has fueled the surge of Russia’s economy is almost completely under the oversight of the state. The largest natural gas provider, Gazprom, is state owned: in fact, the new President, Medvedev, used to be the head of Gazprom. One of the largest oil providers, Rosneft, is state owned, and its private competitors have little autonomy: Lukoil, a major oil provider, is closely supervised by the Kremlin, and one of the former oil giants, Yukos, was only a few years ago completely dismantled by the government and its owner thrown in jail. Clearly, as Russia moves into the 21st century, the economy will continue to be made or broken under the direction of the state.

Under such state dominance, Russia’s economy has been anchored on exporting raw materials. In the tsarist days, Russia, like many of the Eastern European nations, mainly exported food and raw materials, like iron, to the West in exchange for Western manufactured goods. Now, Russia has become one of the world’s largest oil and natural gas providers, and the rising cost of such resources has skyrocketed Russian revenues, sending their economy on a tear with 7% GDP growth.

Whatever the state of the economy throughout Russian history, there has historically been a large gap between a small rich elite and the poorer majority. Tsarist times saw one of the most polarized societies ever, with the majority of the population enserfed – and virtually enslaved – to the small ruling elite. The emancipation of the serfs did not make peasant fortunes rise very much, as redemption payments to the boyars kept most peasants indebted and mired in poverty. During the majority of the 20th century, Communist policies did little to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor despite the fact that their supposed aim was to make everyone equal. Equality, it seemed, meant poverty, as most of Russia remained poor while the state reaped the few economic rewards. The emergence of “capitalism” has yet to disperse wealth evenly amongst Russians. Although Russian incomes are on the rise, the economy is dominated by the state and the mega-rich oligarchs loyal to the state, a loyalty that the state, as the Yukos affair shows, goes to great lengths to ensure.

The extent of state control over the economy, among other factors, has historically stifled competition and motivation. During Tsarist Russia, the serfs had little self-instilled motivation whatsoever to work hard amidst the brutal treatment they were subject to by their boyar masters. Under Communist direction, Russians still had little will to work hard: the state supposedly tried to keep everyone equal, and so there was little room for someone to gain an edge over his neighbors and few luxury goods to indulge in. In addition, since the state controlled all faucets of the economy, there was no room or desire for competition. The lack of output from this system eventually helped cause Communism in Russia to implode. It is truly interesting, then, that the current leadership has retained much of their control over the economy so as to continue to discourage motivation and competition. As a recent Economist article highlighted, blatant corruption and state intervention have not only spawned a host of state-controlled and state-loyal monopolies, but have also encouraged Russians to appeal to the state to get rid of competition rather than to work harder. As Andrei Sharonov, the former deputy economic minister, put it, “It is easier to get a competitor into a jail than to compete with him.”

Russia is by no means an old civilization. Many regions had had many different societies over the course of hundreds – even thousands – of years at the time of Russia’s humble beginnings. Still, a lot changed in the world during the 600 years of Russia’s existence, and some regions look profoundly different from their older selves. In the midst of change, Russia has, remarkably, retained its fundamental elements and has continued to be shaped by them.

Perhaps those in America and elsewhere should not be so surprised by what they see in Russia, considering that it has been happening there in some form for over half a millennium. Given that Russia’s central leaders have historically actively asserted their hold on power, the shady election of Mr. Medvedev earlier this month should hardly raise an eyebrow. Given Russia’s past position in world affairs, it should seem intuitive that Russia continues to assert itself in the world, often opposing the powerful United States, like in their recent opposition of the independence of Kosovo from their Slavic cousin, Serbia (Russian support of which also helped to trigger WWI). Given Russia’s past economic role and makeup, it should seem rather predictable that a small handful of elites control the vast amount of wealth achieved from, once again, exporting raw materials.

For whatever reason, Russia’s fundamental traits have endured and continue to fundamentally define Russia. And the events of the last two decades, if not the last 600 years, should reconfirm that Russia will remain Russia. That is the reality that the United States and the world must accept, and deal with, for years to come.

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ICJ Case: The Malaysia-Singapore Dispute over Pedra Branca and its Maritime Implications

The following is a description and analysis of one of two potentially groundbreaking cases concerning maritime delimitation and island sovereignty pending in the International Court of Justice in 2008. It was resolved in favor of Singapore on May 23, 2008 (updated 2/13/09).

For much of its existence, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the primary judicial wing of the United Nations, has had minimal practical significance. The scope of the ICJ is decidedly narrow, limited to ruling on international disputes jointly agreed upon by both parties involved and basing its rulings solely on international laws and treaties. Moreover, the decisions of the ICJ carry little weight and are usually not readily implemented. As is the case with many of the UN’s organs, the consequences for defying ICJ rulings are implemented – or more often times repealed – by the Security Council, reinforcing the impression of the UN being merely an arbitrary organization at the whim of the five permanent, veto-able members of the Security Council: England, France, Russia, the United States, and China.

At this moment, though, the ICJ has a rare opportunity to have a profound impact. Currently, the ICJ is hearing several landmark cases that could set drastic precedents concerning international law and maritime delimitation. The results could change borders, solidify or discredit international law, and increase or decrease levels of compliance with international law on the part of nations, from the smallest country to one of the P-5. The potential is so great, in fact, that it may be better to leave it untapped.

One of these cases concerns a small, uninhabited island at the mouth of the South China Sea known as Pedra Branca (or Pulau Batu Puteh in Malay). The only manmade structures on the people-less island are the British-built Horsburgh Lighthouse and several support buildings. The dispute over Pedra Branca officially began in 1979 when Singapore contested a newly drawn Malaysian map that recognized the island as part of Malaysia. After several rounds of negotiations, Singapore and Malaysia agreed to submit the matter to the ICJ and to abide by its ruling.

Malaysia claims that there should be no question of ownership because the island is outside the range of islands that were allotted to Singapore after it became a separate entity. In the Crawfurd Treaty of 1827, the Sultanate of Johor, a predecessor of modern-day Malaysia, ceded Singapore and all islands in a 10 mile radius around it to the British East India Company. Pedra Branca, however, lies over 25 miles away from Singapore, and so, Malaysia argues, the British, and subsequently Singapore, never had any legal ownership claims to the island. The fact that the British specifically asked Johor’s permission to build the lighthouse on the island, Malaysia claims, implies that the British recognized Johor sovereignty over the island. By virtue of succession, then, Malaysia asserts that the island, along with the other Johor domains, passed on to Malaysian ownership.

Singapore contends that by constructing and maintaining the lighthouse it and its former British rulers have exerted sovereignty over the island. Since neither Malaysia nor its predecessor, the Sultanate of Johor, ever contested these acts or exerted any sovereignty of their own over the island, Singapore claims that the island effectively belongs to it. In addition, although the British sought permission from Johor to construct the lighthouse, Singapore claims that the British rejected several other locations for the lighthouse specifically because the sites were part of Johor’s territory. The British, Singapore contends, eventually chose Pedra Branca specifically because it was uninhabited and unclaimed by Johor. Therefore, Singapore argues, Malysia has no valid claim to the island, and that, since it took over maintenance of the lighthouse after the British, it remains the only state exercising sovereignty over the island, and thus is the exclusive owner of the island.

Ironically enough, the question of the island’s sovereignty should probably not be a current issue. Malaysia’s constant failure to clear up its vague claims to the island (until now) ensured that the matter would be prolonged and eventually disputed in court. If, at the onset, Malaysia had asserted some sort of authority over Pedra Branca or had at least more openly recognized it as part of its alleged domain, it probably could have determined once and for all the legitimacy of the assumptions regarding Johor’s territory that it so vigorously flaunts today. The answer to that question would have settled the ownership question of the island once and for all (in fact, if that answer were attainable today, it could probably still settle this issue). It is also worth noting that if Malaysia had not expelled Singapore 35 years ago, there would be no need for border disputes between the two parties (as they would have been part of the same country).

With the matter finally being settled in court, neither nation has taken an overly compelling stance. Singapore’s argument is centered on the rather dubious claim that building and maintaining a lighthouse is a sovereign enough act to claim ownership of an entire island while Malaysia’s rests on its unconfirmed, disputable assumptions regarding the extent of Johor’s reign. Both parties invoke British intentions and assumptions in their arguments, neither of which can be definitively proven since the letters exchanged between the British and Johor specifically regarding Pedra Branca have never been recovered.

These British assumptions and opinions can be inferred, though, from the surviving relevant documents, whose interpretation may very well determine the outcome of the case. The interpretation of the intent of the Crawfurd Treaty could solidify or discredit Malaysia’s claim to de facto possession over the island. The treaty definitively states that Singapore and all islands within a 10 mile radius of it were to be granted to the British. However, the treaty does not directly state whether this is a limit on British expansion or simply a base amount from where the British could perhaps expand later. Malaysia has contended that the treaty put a cap on British expansion, but this is an odd interpretation to make when one considers that the treaty rewarded the British with land it had not previously owned. Besides, given the overall expansionist trend of the British Empire, it seems logical to contemplate that the British may very well had every intention of expanding farther into Southeast Asia.

Although the letters specifically pertaining to Pedra Branca have been lost, letters exchanged on the issue of the construction of the lighthouse (without specifying an exact location) have survived. After examining the surviving letters exchanged between the British and Johor, it seems apparent that the British never had any expansionist motives for building the lighthouse. The lighthouse seemed to have been built to further trade and make the seas safer, not to settle and claim ownership over an obscure, uninhabited island. Indeed, the Sultan and the Temenggong in several letters granted permission for the construction of the lighthouse on the basis that it would help foster trade and not British expansion. According to these letters, Singapore is trying to distort the original intent of the British maintenance of the lighthouse.

Even after examining all the available evidence (and also in light of what evidence is unavailable), there still seems to be no clear victor. However, there is also a much more profound factor that transcends the Malaysia-Singapore dispute that the ICJ should consider with utmost sincerity in its ruling: the potential precedents involving maritime delimitation and island sovereignty. After all the debate and the deliberations in the ICJ, in the final vote Singapore may very well emerge victorious. Ruling in favor of Singapore, though, particularly on the basis of its maintenance of the lighthouse, could set a groundbreaking precedent. To do so would in effect reward Singapore for building a structure on a neglected, yet legitimately disputed island. Pedra Branca is by no means the only neglected island that is the territory of a nation; many such islands dot the Pacific, Atlantic, and, for that matter, the entire globe. Other nations may be emboldened by this ruling to start building and maintaining structures on sparsely maintained islands around the world, heightening tensions between the various nations that have claimed islands and potentially wreaking havoc on the existing maritime boundaries and exclusive economic zones. Such aggressive action would not be a good thing for the ICJ – and by extension the UN – to support, given that the very nature of the UN is to try to facilitate peace and international cooperation. A precedent such as this would likely further discredit the UN and international law itself and might call into question other UN statutes. The ICJ has a chance to make a very big impact indeed with this case for better or, more likely, for worse, if it rules in favor of Singapore.

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What about Iraq?

Just a few months ago, and during the three preceding years, Iraq was the hot-button issue in America, cutting a swath between Americans of all ages and backgrounds. It seemed that each day Iraq updates made the top stories of nearly every major news corporation. Not since Vietnam did a war influence an election as much as Iraq did the 2006 elections. The war infiltrated the halls of Congress, causing much debate and setting off a showdown between the Democratic majority in Congress and the embattled President and his supporters. Politicians from every corner of the land did their best to avoid scrutiny from their positions on Iraq.

Then, the surge was instituted and soon started boasting a stark reduction of violence in Iraq and a growing sense of security in the minds of Iraqis. As a result, Iraq has rather suddenly disappeared from the limelight. Recent attacks and their body counts no longer litter the front pages of the news. As the 2008 elections loom, the economy has displaced Iraq as the most important issue for voters. Congress now predominantly buzzes with other topics, and people whose support of the war had just a few months earlier made them tread lightly are now trumpeting the success of the surge. The surge’s acclaim has particularly helped the revival of Senator John McCain’s Presidential chances.

Doubtlessly, conditions in Iraq have improved somewhat over the last few months, but don’t be fooled by the so-called “success” of the surge. The improvements that the surge has supposedly brought have been dramatically exaggerated.

Supporters of the surge claim that the influx of troops has sizably decreased the violence in Iraq. While it is true that combat deaths have gone down since the surge, conditions in Iraq remain anything but peaceful. Soldiers continue to die at a troubling rate: over 30 U.S. troops died this past month, back to the same level they were during the height of summer 2006. Despite the recent “stemming” of violence, Iraqi security forces and citizens are still dying in the hundreds and thousands every month. These are hardly the characteristics of a peaceful nation. Those Iraqis lucky enough to survive continue to suffer greatly in Iraq: many are still without basic utilities, services, good nutrition, or good sanitation.

Worse yet, the regional, ethnic, and religious divisions that are the source of the violence tearing apart Iraq have not been reconciled during this slight dip in bloodshed. The fervent inter-Muslim Sunni-Shiite rivalry persists and continues to be a source of division and instability in Iraq. Indeed, this religious rift has increasingly come to define the nature of the insurgent in-fighting in Iraq, with Sunni and Shiite factions battling each other, the Iraqi government, and the U.S. military to try to gain the upper hand. The differences between the Arabs and the Kurds constitute a slightly different animosity. The Kurds, who have lived in Northern Iraq for centuries more than the Arabs have in the South, have a different ethnicity and culture from their Arab counterparts. Rarely have ethnic differences been a unifying factor, and Iraq is no exception.

These tensions, formidable enough by their very nature, have been magnified even more by the historical winner-take-all nature of the Iraqi political system. From Saddam Hussein and his predecessors to the current Iraqi parliament, the Iraq government has favored the faction in power at the expense of the others. Hussein in particular benefited his Sunni kinsman even as he ruthlessly repressed and murdered many Shiites and the Kurds, even forcibly resettling Kurdish villages with Arabs. Unfortunately, this trend was not reversed after Hussein’s regime was toppled by the U.S. led coalition forces in 2003: the current Constitution does little to thwart majority rule or protect the rights of the minority. As a result, the Shiite majority in parliament has been able to favor the Shiites over their rivals. In fact, an interim Congressional report on Iraq in July 2007 admitted that there was sectarian Shiite bias in the appointment of military commanders and with regards to military and police intelligence. While not as skewed or as ruthless as Hussein, these measures have nevertheless been enough to convince the Iraqi factions that any government, whether democratic or authoritarian, that is not headed by them will make life hard for them. The accumulative effect of these high political stakes and the existing religious and ethnic tensions has caused the Iraqi factions to plunge the country into civil war as they fight for supremacy – for control of the country after the inevitable day that the U.S. military withdraws.

The best possible chance for the U.S. military to avert this impending civil war is to somehow change the nature of Iraqi politics. For U.S. forces, this recent dip in violence is as good a chance as they will ever get to initiate some sort of political reconciliation to lower the high political stakes. But no adequate political reconciliation has taken place during the surge. The closest thing to reconciliation has been a law allowing former Baath party members to apply for their former minor government posts. With Iraq in chaos, the potential practical significance of such a measure has been greatly reduced: getting a boost to the administration of Iraq would have been useful after the overthrow of Hussein’s regime, but at this point it is too little too late. No other Congressional benchmark has been met, nor any other form of political reconciliation been reached. If the Iraqi parliament manages to agree on some checks on government power and some minority rights, perhaps the Iraqi factions would be willing to give this government a chance. But, as of now, the different Iraqi groups have not been willing to risk compromising their interests by adequately supporting any of these measures. In doing so, they doom themselves to a constant struggle for total power where in the long run, nobody truly wins.

Even as the surge fruitlessly tries to unify the country and bring about stability, some of its methods do exactly the opposite. In an attempt to bring about greater security in the wide-open areas of Iraq, particularly Anbar province, the U.S. military armed and supported several local militias to fight Al Qaeda militants and keep order. While this strategy has reduced Al Qaeda activity and has brought about more peace in some regions, it has also had some unintended consequences. By arming and supporting local militias, the U.S. military has increased the power of such militias and warlords and has actively encouraged the formation of new militias. In doing so, the U.S. military has effectively undermined the Iraqi security forces that it has placed such an emphasis on training and bolstering. Moreover, by increasing the power of local militias and warlords, the U.S. military has deepened the regional divides in Iraq that may soon cause it to erupt in full-fledged civil war.

It is true that conditions in Iraq have improved, if ever so slightly, since the surge. Unfortunately for Iraq, none of the critical elements plaguing Iraq were dealt with during the slight window of opportunity afforded by the surge. As troop levels start dropping to pre-surge levels, the tensions that were to some degree held in suspended animation will be in full violent swing once again. What little improvement the surge has brought will be undone by these forces consuming Iraq. Such is the destiny of any benefits that U.S. military might could bring to Iraq. As long as the Iraqis are unable to reconcile their differences, the divisions will remain strong, leading to violence or dictatorship. As violence reemerges, Iraq will reemerge on the front pages of the news, and it will be a long time before Iraq is absent from them again.

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Images From Rafah

In a brilliant display of defiance, Hamas bombs toppled several sections of the Israeli-built barrier between Gaza and Egypt last week, and in doing so ended, if only momentarily, Israel’s six-month long isolation of Gaza. The images from this incident vividly depict the fallout of this latest Israeli policy debacle.

The bright explosions that pierced the darkness of last Wednesday night were the latest and most visible examples of Hamas’ growing power and boldness, despite Israel’s efforts to undermine it. From the outset, Hamas has gained much of its popularity by providing services to the Gazans. When Hamas overthrew the Palestinian Authority in Gaza last June, Israel thought that if it isolated Gaza as long as Hamas was in charge, the Gazans would be motivated to overthrow Hamas in favor of Fatah or another, more “moderate” faction. As economic conditions worsened, though, Gazans directed their hate towards Israel instead of Hamas. In fact, they actually turned to Hamas for more help, making Hamas that much more influential and popular. The sabotage of the border wall was Hamas’ most recent move to defy the latest Israeli measures against Gaza.

The sea of Gazans that flowed through the breach in the Gaza-Egypt barrier showed the growing desperation of the Gazans. The Gazan economy has taken a turn for the worst since Hamas’ coup last June. The Western-imposed economic isolation has stifled economic activity and has caused scarcity. The Israeli military strikes against Hamas militants have damaged the infrastructure, further stagnating economic activity. Already impoverished and desperate, the Israel’s recent move to cut off several basic utilities has made conditions for the Gazans even worse. With supplies running low and desperation mounting, the Gazans made the most of the one sliver of an opportunity afforded them last week, swarming out of their quasi-imprisonment to stock up for the hardships to come.

The vanguard of Egyptian troops that stood aside and let the mass of Gazans file past them was a visible snapshot into the complex motives of the Egyptian government. Egypt’s unsteady relationship with Israel has had its advantages, but it has brought Egypt under fire from much of its people and from radical groups and radical countries, such as Iran. Letting the Gazans pass carries its risks. It is hard to physically provide for the needs of tens of thousands of people and even harder to police them. Egypt in particular has a vested interest in preventing arms smuggling into Gaza, afraid that Hamas may incite the Egyptian-based Muslim Brotherhood to radical action or pressure on the government. The Gazans themselves still have some ill feelings towards the Egyptian government because of its harsh rule of Gaza from 1948-1967. And of course the Israelis certainly do not want the Gazans out. As the Egyptian public grew more and more dissatisfied with Israel, though, Egypt felt more comfortable listening to the demands of the public than those of Israel. Besides, physically forcing back a tide of tens of thousands of people would not be an easy task in itself, and hardly worth the trouble simply on the behalf of the fragile, unpopular Israeli alliance. So, after weighing all the parameters, Egypt took a step away from Israel and let the Gazans pass.

Not only has Israel’s policy not achieved its intended goals, but it has also not been adequately enforced, as last week’s sabotage showed. But, to be fair, Israel’s actions were not irrational. Few would contend that Israel has an easy security situation. All too often Israel has been confronted by an incessant barrage of attacks from radical groups seeking its total destruction or at least the reduction of its controversial domain. Israel, a nation that has frequently had to fight for its very existence, has historically retaliated fairly strongly against its adversaries. In the wake of the recent bombardment by Hamas, then, last week’s Israeli response that cut off electrical power and other key supplies from Gaza was not totally unreasonable.

It is pretty safe to say, though, that Israel’s heavy handed approaches have not significantly curtailed the violence directed against it. Last week’s collective punishment, the apex of a nearly six month long strategy of isolating Gaza, is the latest Israeli action that has served to compromise its security even as it seeks to enforce it.

The uncomfortable reality is that Israel has no easy road to long-term security. But clearly, its current road is leading it in the wrong direction. Last week’s explosion should be a vivid reality check to Israel that it is time to change course. Perhaps a less heavy-handed approach would work better and would not cause such dramatic retribution. If Israel were to reach out to the Gazans rather than isolate them, maybe they would not rely on Hamas so much. If Israel were to bolster Gaza's economy rather than deflate it, maybe the Gazans would have too much to lose to risk being radical. Perhaps then Israel and Gaza would move towards a lasting peace instead of towards a constant struggle.

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Tribalism: Kenya's Ticking Timebomb

A few months ago, few would have predicted that scenes of violence and chaos would unfold in Kenya. Although throughout much of Africa such violence and suffering has become commonplace, Kenya was always perceived in a different light from the rest of the continent. Kenya, whose economy and stability easily trump those of its neighbors, did not seem as susceptible to violence and chaos as the rest of Africa.

This prosperity and peace, though, masked a stark premonition of the violence to come. Although different on the surface from much of Africa, Kenya shared one essential trait with the rest of the continent: tribal animosities. These ethnic divisions, long suppressed by economic wealth and enforced order, were unbound in the aftermath of last December’s disputed elections. Now, the wave of violence initiated by Opposition Leader Ralia Odinga’s Luo tribe against President Mwai Kibaki’s Kikuyu tribe, the largest ethnic group, is putting Kenya on the verge of internal collapse.

While violence on this scale is unusual for Kenya, the effect of tribal divisions on politics is not. Indeed, the political parties of Kenya are predominantly tribal based, and governmental policies have often benefited the tribe in power at the expense of the others. The relative power of certain tribes over time has greatly impacted the economic and political gaps in Kenya. The elite status that the Kikuyu enjoy in business and politics is a result of their favoritism under the rule of the first President, Founding Father Jomo Kenyatta, and under current President Kibaki. The Kalenjin, seen as somewhat subordinate to the Kikuyu and the Luo, got a taste of power and wealth that they have yet to fully relinquish under the authoritative rule of Daniel Arap Moi. The Luo, although the second largest tribe, have never had one of their own as President. They have been at the wrong end of all the tribal enrichment policies, particularly Kikuyu ones, leaving a bitter taste in their mouth. Indeed, far from toning down ethnic differences, Kenya’s leaders during its time of peace have intensified tribal differences.

Only the strong authority of such leaders prevented an earlier ethnic implosion of Kenya. The fact that, since independence, Kenya has had only three leaders in nearly 45 years should be a testament to the powerful hold that Kenyan leaders have had over their country. Some leaders have been so formidable that the major tribes were forced to put aside their differences and ally against the encroaching government. As colonial rule floundered in the 1950s, the British tried to play off the Luo against their historical (and current) enemies, the Kikuyu. The Luo, though, judged the British presence to be so imposing that they allied with their adversary Kikuyu against the British, forcing the British to relinquish Kenya as its colony. After leading the ousting of the British and becoming the first ruler of modern Kenya, Kenyatta ruled assertively and effectively. With the aid of his popularity and savvy, Kenyatta was strong enough to maintain order. After Kenyatta’s death in 1978, Moi wielded a heavy hand of power for nearly 25 years, crushing all unrest and any opposition to his rule. Moi’s chokehold on the country once again spawned an alliance between the Luo and the Kikuyu. When Moi finally stepped down, the Kikuyu and Luo backed Kibaki, who defeated Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Jomo Kenyatta and Moi’s handpicked successor, in the 2002 election.

The power of Kibaki, though, did not amount to anything close to what his predecessors possessed. Kibaki used a hands-off approach, letting his ministers perform most functions of government (his old age may have left him with no other option). Kibaki’s passive rule resulted in inefficient, uncoordinated rule that allowed the long-brewing tribal animosities to emerge from the shadows. These revived tensions would greatly impact the December elections. The Luo, led by Odinga, played on the resentment towards the wealthy Kikuyu to build up a coalition strong enough to challenge Kibaki. The close election laden with allegations of fraud on Kibaki’s part became the spark that set off these mounting tribal tensions into full-fledged violence.

Kenya could not have been engulfed by violence at a worse time. The 2002 elections marked the end of a ruthless regime that heightened the tribal tensions even as it suppressed them. If these elections had led Kenya down the path of democracy, then, as long as the government was strong, effective, and fair, perhaps people would have started to participate based on economic and personal motives rather than tribal ones. If this happened, tribal differences would have steadily decreased in meaning over the years. Unfortunately, Kibaki’s style of government was neither strong nor effective nor fair. If he had accepted defeat, though, perhaps the democratic current would have endured. But by cheating his way to victory, Kibaki ruined the best chance for lasting democracy – and the steady eradication of tribal differences.

Aside from obvious political and security consequences, the reemergence of tribal fighting has had and will continue to hurt the economies of Kenya and the rest of the Horn of Africa. Although Kenya’s past stability was somewhat misleading, it nevertheless enabled Kenya’s economy to become one of the most dynamic in all of Africa. Now, the recent tribal violence has disrupted Kenya’s sources of wealth. Kenya’s reputation as a popular tourist destination is dwindling. Many Western tourists who booked safaris and other attractions for the summer are making new travel plans, dealing a blow to the hotels, wildlife parks, and other accommodating businesses that revolve around tourism. Trade has suffered as well. Kenya’s infrastructure has been vandalized by the raging tribal gangs, hurting the flow of goods and decreasing domestic and foreign confidence in the Kenyan market. Mombasa, the main port of Kenya, has been engulfed in violence even as fewer ships sail into its harbor. The impact of this disruption of trade is not confined to Kenya. Mombasa has long been a source of goods and wealth for the rest of the Horn of Africa, particularly landlocked countries such as Uganda. With Mombasa in disarray, the Kenyan infrastructure damaged, and overall economic activity declining, the Horn economies would do well to brace for a recession.

While the economic situation is foreboding indeed, the recent chaos in Kenya may end up having a far worse long term effect. No matter how important tribal identity is, peace and prosperity invariably have some effect on population, particularly future generations. As tribal differences were muted, whole new generations of Kenyans started to buy into the fact that they were different from the rest of Africa. They felt that Kenya had succeeded in finding peace and prosperity where others had failed. In younger generations, confidence started to grow in the institutions and economy of Kenya. Now, with this onset of chaos, these perceptions are losing hold. Kenyans are starting to think that maybe they are not so special after all; that maybe the past success was a lie; that maybe tribal differences have doomed Kenya like they have the rest of Africa. Mindset can be so crucial to the success of an individual and a nation. As Kenya descends into chaos, the mindset of future generations will turn from a motivation for prosperity and peace and revert back to one strictly based on tribal loyalty. Should the instability continue, Kenya may very well continue down this path to the point where the people may have the same one-sided ethnic mindset that thrives in much of Africa. Should that happen, Kenya would indeed cease to be different and would become another African failure. And then Africa would have lost perhaps its brightest silver lining.

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The NIE Iran Report: a Warning in Disguise

In the wake of disturbing international situations and trends, particularly the growing troubles arising in the Middle East, some people were quick to embrace the idea that Iran was no longer a nuclear threat. The support for such a theory came from the first paragraph of the National Intelligence Estimate’s November 2007 report on Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities, which began by saying “We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program.” Better yet, the paragraph went on to say that “we judge with high confidence that the halt… was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure.” Such words were a welcome change from the flurry of news stories on the more daunting Middle East scenarios in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere. The words of the rest of the report, though, depict a situation just as daunting, if not more so, than the rest of the Middle East picture. In short, the subsequent sections of the report show that Tehran remains very capable of obtaining nuclear weapons, despite its so-called halt, and is in fact still getting closer to becoming a nuclear power.

The people that interpreted the report’s first paragraph as meaning that Iran had halted its entire nuclear operation misunderstood the scope of that paragraph. When the report says Iran halted its “nuclear weapons program,” it is referring to “Iran’s nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work; we do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment.”

The definition does not refer to the entire nuclear weapons process, and so the statement about the “nuclear weapons program” being halted does not extend to the entire nuclear operation. Ironically enough, the part of the nuclear program defined is one that does not require any sensitive, directly nuclear aspects. Any nation with sufficient engineering capabilities could very well design a nuclear missile. Of course, designing such a weapon would mean little if the country did not possess enough enriched uranium or other fissile material to build it. Therefore, a nation’s level of proficiency in nuclear weapon design does not serve as an accurate barometer of such a nation’s nuclear program.

A more accurate indicator would be if a county possessed or tried to obtain the necessary fissile material. According to the following paragraphs of the report, this indicator is present in Iran, as “Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so.” The report not only warns that “Iran’s civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing,” but also that “Iran resumed its declared centrifuge enrichment activities in January 2006,” and made “significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz.”

Iran’s continued enrichment of uranium along with its upgrading of its nuclear facilities should raise suspicions of a potential Iranian military nuclear objective. While this evidence alone cannot rule out the possibility that Iran has a civilian objective in mind, an examination of Iran’s interests can. For Iran, a civilian nuclear program does not make a whole lot of sense. With a large supply of domestic oil, it would not seem that Iran would have an immediate need for another source of wealth or energy, particularly one that is so costly and requires importing the fuel. A nuclear weapon, though, would likely be in their interests, allowing, among other things, for greater influence over their Middle Eastern neighbors, particularly over nuclear Israel, where the passionate issue of religion comes into play. Between this logic and the evidence amassed throughout the entire report, it seems most likely that Iran is furthering its nuclear weapons operation.

In fact, a closer examination of Iran’s strategy should cause even more foreboding thoughts. Suspending the design of nuclear weapons while continuing to enrich uranium is a way for Iran to not only further its nuclear ambitions, but also to lessen the diplomatic pressure levied against it. Ever since 2003, when satellite images were taken of several large and fortified nuclear facilities, Iran has faced the brunt of nuclear non-proliferation sanctions and has become increasingly isolated. The economic sanctions, although not applied by everyone, have nonetheless hampered Iran’s fragile oil-centric economy. The effects have certainly been felt by much of the Iranian population, sparking more internal pressure on a government already embattled by diplomatic pressure and isolation. While these measures have not been sufficient to cause Iran to change course or ideology, they have certainly made life much harder for Iran.

Iran’s suspension of its weapons design program, as depicted in this report, has changed all that. The latest wave of UN pressure has subsided, in large part because China, which was close to compromising with U.S. demands in the UN, has used the report as an excuse to withdraw its support for the U.S. backed measures. Indeed many in the United States now question whether taking such measures is still necessary or appropriate. In addition, Russia began supplying Iran’s Bushehr reactor with nuclear fuel following the report’s release. In one deft stroke, Iran had reversed its fortunes, appeasing enough of the world to lay off pressure while still gathering all the parts necessary for a nuclear bomb, waiting for the opportune moment to construct a nuclear arsenal.

In light of Iraq and similar debacles, the U.S. intelligence community has become increasingly restrained in its actions and reports, striving not to provoke anyone by being as careful as possible. How ironic, then, that such a report crafted to be as specific and comprehensible as possible has been so broadly misinterpreted. Worse yet, such misunderstandings have set the wrong events in motion. The report, in its entirety, does not describe a country bowing to international pressure but one that has modified its strategy in order to appease the aggressors while achieving the same goal. For a time, it seemed that North Korea was cooperating with international demands as well. Then, as international pressure eased, the nation quietly continued its rise to nuclear status. According to this report, Iran has made a similar impression. Unfortunately, this same report caused international pressure to once again ease off in the face of supposed success. One can only hope that Iran’s fate will not be the same as Pakistan’s or North Korea’s. Or this report may very well have drastic implications for years to come.

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Pakistan: A Solution for the Long Run

Pakistan’s President, Pervez Musharraf, has always had a great knack for staying in power, having to cling to his rule from the beginning. For the first few years, he ruled as an outright dictator, staying afloat due to his command of the military and his periodic promises of democracy. When the moment came for “democracy” to ensue, Musharraf rigged both the Presidential and Parliamentary elections to effectively prolong his authority. Whenever pressure mounted from the United States to help in the “war on terror,” Musharraf’s army mounted modest operations in the Northwestern borderlands; whenever pressure mounted from the locals and Muslims, Musharraf eased back on such operations.

And, as international pressure mounted in the face of the latest wave of riots, Musharraf removed his uniform, becoming an official citizen. This is not as surprising as it may seem; Musharraf would not have made such a move if he knew it would spell the immediate end of his power. Doubtless he still has considerable influence over the army. Doubtless still more, though, his influence will never be as strong as it was. Indeed his generalship provided the base of his power, and so the loss of his uniform will most likely start the slow, yet sure passing of Musharraf’s authority.

As Musharraf fades away, a new authority will rise in Pakistan. Who or what replaces him, though, and under what circumstances they do, will be long in the making. Anyone with any power will likely be in the mix. Amidst this uncertainty, the United States could use its considerable influence over Pakistan to try to shape what becomes of post-Musharraf Pakistan. At best, the United States could help point Pakistan towards an era of relative lasting peace in Pakistan while also furthering vital U.S. interests in Pakistan. At worst, the window of opportunity will close for awhile, and Pakistan will, at best, continue to live on the edge of chaos, with the conflict against the jihadists and the fate of the nuclear arsenal hanging in the balance.

A balanced formula that would accomplish a majority of U.S. interests in Pakistan remains elusive, given all the variables in Pakistan that influence U.S interests. Stability, so crucial for a nuclear nation like Pakistan, has been hard to come by in Pakistan’s modern history, and its brief reigns have come at terrible prices, almost always in the form of military dictators or corrupt nominal democracies. Intra-Muslim splits and class divides have made ultimate stability especially elusive. Regardless of the security situation, no Pakistani government has ever exercised adequate authority over all regions. In particular, the determined Pashtuns of Waziristan have resisted outside control for centuries. Unluckily enough, for the last few years these proud and hospitable people have given refuge to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. In their new home, these organizations have remade themselves into the potent threats that they were in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has been a nuclear proliferation nightmare ever since its creation. One of its operators, A.Q. Khan, ran a kind of nuclear black market, with nuclear technology originating from him turning up from Libya to North Korea. Pakistan itself could be the setting of nuclear disasters, given the instability in the country containing the warheads. The proximity of such dangerous groups like Al Qaeda and the Taliban to such devastating weapons creates even more disaster potential should Pakistan descend into chaos.

The current policy directs a disproportionate share of focus towards stability, which has made it both ineffective and self-wounding. Since Musharraf has long been viewed as the only perceivable option for stability, the United States has supported him rather unilaterally, meeting virtually whatever concessions he offered, even as many of them came at the expense of other U.S. interests in Pakistan, so that a stable Pakistan could keep a tab on its nuclear arsenal. Ironically, what Musharraf brought to Pakistan was far from stability. It brought, at most, fragile lapses of violence, often punctuated by riots, most recently last month’s lawyer protests. Like his predecessors, Musharraf’s rule did not extend through all of Pakistan, including volatile Waziristan where the extremists are hiding out.

Now that Musharraf’s end looms, the United States should start to formulate a new policy. This policy should, among other things, demand more of the Pakistani authority than just stability. The United States cannot let other national security interests suffer because of the fear of chaos and its ramifications. The United States should have learned from the Cold War that propping up an unpopular leader only works up to a point. Granting these leaders such drastic diplomatic leverage as Musharraf enjoyed only wounds the United States for the sake of a stability that would likely not last. If the United States stops negotiating against itself, maybe then it would have enough leverage of its own to further more of its interests, such as gaining custody of A. Q. Khan.

Achieving each of these policy goals separately would require a sizeable amount of brain and manpower. On the other hand, a Pakistan that remains stable in the long-term would make furthering U.S. interests a great deal easier. The United States would do well to help encourage Pakistani leaders to create a framework that would maintain long-term stability. The power void caused by Musharraf’s decline provides the perfect opportunity for this.

Modern Pakistan has never been very successful under centralized rule, but historically the Indian subcontinent has done fairly well under decentralized rule. Indeed, the subcontinent reached the peak of its prosperity nearly 2000 years ago under the decentralized Gupta Empire. Perhaps a return to a decentralized framework would facilitate a similar stability and peace. In modern political terms, perhaps a federal framework would thrive. Powerful regional authorities could not only help to check the power of the central government, but could also help to ensure that the central government would not distort the democracy or deny the population of their rights. If activists truly feel their country can accomplish democracy, they should be more than willing to give a federal framework a shot. In addition, a more decentralized rule over the provinces would be appealing to the quasi-independent fringe provinces like Waziristan. Under a federal framework, they could retain their independence through the system rather than in spite of the system. They may be more likely to cooperate with U.S. demands for Al Qaeda and the Taliban if the possibility of such a plan were at stake. If such a plan succeeds in facilitating some sort of lasting stability, then perhaps the nuclear arsenal would be secure for awhile and Pakistan could become more prosperous.

Getting such a plan through power-consolidating figures and institutions, especially the army, would be challenging. However, soon Pakistan will not have a sole figure or institution with unquestioned power. Musharraf was once, but he has sealed his decline. A few people could potentially succeed him, but that would take several years, leaving Pakistan without an insurmountable authority figure. During this lapse, the United States, with its influences over various groups and its economic clout, could have an opportunity to encourage the formulation of this idea. The results may not be ideal, but considering what the reality is, it sure seems worth a try.

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The Armenian Genocide Resolution: An Unlikely Source for Congress’ Potential Legacy

The Democratic majority that stormed to power in the election of the 110th Congress had great expectations to put an end to the tide of President Bush’s controversial policies.

Nearly a year later, though, all the Democrats have to show for their promise is a minimum wage increase, fiery partisan rhetoric, and potentially landmark Iraq policy bills squashed by Bush’s veto.

Now Congress threatens to finally make a real difference, and even they themselves are surprised by it.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee had a largely symbolic objective in mind when it voted to send a resolution to the floor that labeled Turkey’s killing of 1.5 million Armenians as genocide. In light of recent events, though, it appears that this decision will have a lot more practical impact than intended – or sought.

Within a day the Turkish ambassador was recalled from Washington, and within a week the Turkish parliament authorized a potential invasion of Northern Iraq, in defiance of the United States, to round up Kurdish rebels stationed there. Even so, this may only be the beginning: Turkey has the potential to immediately affect U.S. policy, European policy, and the long term stability of the Middle East.

In an America where Iraq remains such a heated issue, it seems astonishing that U.S. politicians would tread so heedlessly on a nation that plays such a critical role in Iraq. For the military, no country plays a more important part than Turkey, which has become the logistical keystone for the U.S. military. Around 70% of air shipments to Iraq are flown across Turkey and that an array of supplies, particularly fuel, passes through Turkey en route to Iraq. Should Turkey stop providing logistical support, the U.S. military would have to resort to longer, less efficient, and costlier routes (as if Americans weren’t paying enough for the war already!)
Another, more destabilizing Turkish action regarding Iraq, though, would soon dwarf any fuss over logistics. The recent vote by the Turkish parliament could precede a move that many in Turkey have deemed necessary in the wake of the growing chaos in Iraq: an invasion of Kurdish Northern Iraq. The fallout of this move could fundamentally alter the stability and geopolitical landscape of the Middle East.

In an essence, though, the current boundaries in the Middle East are somewhat arbitrary, which is the underlying cause of the tensions leading up to this drama. Although, some thought was given to ethnic differences, the post-World War I borders, carved out of the domains of the former Ottoman Empire, were designed primarily to further the colonial ambitions of Britain and France in the region. In fact, such reckless boundary making led to meshing of a Kurdish bloc, a Sunni bloc, and a Shiite bloc together into a single country: present day Iraq. U.S. troops are currently witnessing the latest melee in the perpetual cycle of violence/authoritarianism in Iraq.

The Kurds trapped inside the Iraq border were formerly part of a distinctly Kurdish region in the Northern Middle East. The rest of the Kurdish population were encased by the borders of modern Turkey, Iran, and a little bit of Syria. Many Kurds long for a country of their own, in their ancient homeland, free from the oppression they have faced in the countries they were forced into. As the Iraqi Arab sects have engaged in the latest civil war there, the Kurds of Northern Iraq have grown ever more independent from the rest of Iraq, only loosely governed (as if any part of Iraq really isn’t at this point) by the Maliki government. It would seem that the possibility of Northern Iraq attempting to secede from the rest of Iraq to form Kurdistan does not seem so farfetched or far off. Such secession would send shivers up the spine of the Turkish government, since an independent Kurdistan would likely hold great appeal for the Kurds of Turkey, who have long been at the mercy of their Turkish rulers. Indeed, Turkey fears that Southeastern, Kurdish Turkey would in turn try to secede as well and become part of the new Kurdistan. To prevent this security nightmare scenario, Turkey would invade Northern Iraq with the goal of quelling the Kurdish Separatist movement (PKK) and demonstrating the futility of trying to form a Kurdish state.

An invasion of Northern Iraq would burst the security bubbles of the surrounding countries. The Kurdish regions of Iran and Syria would likely try to secede from their respective states and join up with the new Kurdistan, causing great unrest and massive oppression. The Turkish military would be stretched to the limit occupying Northern Iraq while simultaneously trying to prevent the secession of the Kurdish region of Turkey. In the chaos, the remainder of Iraq could split into Sunni and Shiite states that might try to invade Northern Iraq for themselves to capture the oil fields there. The conflict between these new states could spill over into neighboring countries already reeling from the Kurdish shockwaves. Or, neighboring countries could join in on the fray to try to annex the Sunni and Shiite states and to even make a foray into the oil fields of the North as well. Meanwhile, the U.S. military would find itself in a quagmire many times as thick as now, attempting to reunify the shattered elements of Iraq, as they are presently, but with increased intervention by Turkey and potentially other nations. Indeed the U.S. and Turkish militaries might engage each other, causing ugly diplomatic repercussions. The inevitable abuses of Kurds by the Turkish military would most likely lead to Turkey’s expulsion from NATO and may bring about an end to any remaining positive Euro-Turkish relations.

Such diplomatic consequences could ultimately make Turkey the biggest loser of the invasion. Fear of such repercussions have managed to check the Turkish military so far, but should incidents like the Armenian genocide resolution continue to pile up, and should the situation in Iraq continue to spiral out of control, Turkey may feel that it has no choice but to invade.

Even still, it remains relatively unlikely that such a catastrophic scenario will unfold solely as a result of the genocide resolution. Nevertheless, the genocide resolution is the latest source of ever growing tension between Turkey and the West that threatens to fundamentally alter the role of Turkey in the world.

Though Turkey has long had one of the largest Muslim populations and, as the Ottoman Empire, was once the champion of the Muslim world, since the 1920s it has had a tradition of state-enforced secularism, dating back to the rule of Ataturk. Such secular administration and society has made Europeans more willing to work with Turkey. Even as the Muslims of Turkey felt an allure to the political and cultural trends of the nearby Middle East, the policies of the Turkish government would often partially reflect the influences of Europe. Ataturk decided long ago that Turkey would be better off as a secular caterer to Europe, and that continuing trend has arguably been his greatest legacy.

Turkey, as a result, became something of a Western island in the Middle East. Europe and America have generally been able to present enough incentives to maintain a fair degree of such influence in Turkey. Most recently, Europe has considered Turkey as a candidate to join the European Union, and Turkey has taken several Euro-friendly steps necessary to fulfill the requirements for EU membership and to appeal to leaders of the EU, such as France and Germany, to admit it. America, along with its superpower status, sends annual economic and military aid to Turkey, and in turn Turkey has long been a supporter of Israel.

However, tension has started to mount between Turkey and the West. U.S. policy debacles with regards to Iraq, torture, and the “war on terror” as well as the unilateral fashion with which such policies were executed have worked to isolate America from everyone, and Turkey is no exception. In fact, Turkey is feeling particular pressure from the tide of anti-U.S. sentiment in the Middle East from its large Muslim population. Try as they might to distance themselves from America, Europe has been tarred with the same brush nevertheless (they call it the West for a reason). As a result, association with the West has lost some of its allure of old, and Turkey wonders, for good reason, whether to continue to defy its disgruntled Muslim base to be in league with an increasingly unpopular West.

One resolution condemning genocide will probably not dismantle U.S.-Turkey relations, but it will add to the trend that has been a recent source of tension between the nations. Eventually, should the trend continue, Turkey may distance itself from Western objectives in favor of the objectives of Middle Eastern powerhouses, such as Iran. To be fair, such a shift would not be without consequence for Turkey: they would doubtless lose countless economic and political benefits from the West. But as this trend continues, it becomes ever more likely that Turkey will slowly, but surely cease to be in the sphere of the West.

That being said, it should be reaffirmed that genocide should not be tolerated: there is no greater crime than to wipe a population off the face of the Earth. However, there is a time and a place for everything, and now is not the time to further antagonize Turkey.

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As Bush Maintains a Stranglehold on Torture, he Further Strangles his Country’s Safety

If there is one thing that defines President Bush, it is that he never wavers in his support of his beliefs. Some praise his loyalty and persistence. Others sigh at what he unquestionably supports and groan at the lengths he goes to support it. Perhaps none of the President’s actions have drawn more breath than the aggressive interrogation methods applied to “enemy combatants” detained indefinitely without basic legal rights. Last July’s executive order was the latest statute implemented in a long line of legislation by a President that has not hesitated to supersede both the Geneva Conventions and various Supreme Court decisions regarding such methods. The President has exploited every legal loophole and has toed multiple Constitutional boundaries as he remodeled and reworded legislation so that he could retain the authority to detain any handful of people overseas and treat them however he pleased. The President thought that the techniques would succeed in making the country safer, and that the safety of the country justified the means. Unfortunately, the evidence, far from applauding the President’s judgment, shows not only that the aggressive techniques do not work, but that the internal and external repercussions of torture far outweigh any benefits the President hoped the procedures would bring.

Torture is as old as civilization itself. Ever since the formation of the first security forces torture techniques have been used to wrench information out of its victims. Whatever its form, the extraction of information through torture has always been justified by one thread of logic: the more aggressive and painful the methods of interrogation, the more and better quality information extracted. This thought is logical up to a point, but then makes the wrong conclusion. The basis of torture logic is man’s most fundamental instinct: avoiding pain at all costs. Based on this, torture logic follows that if a man knows that how much pain he suffers depends on the whim of another, then he will try to please that man so that the pain may stop. This logic is fine so far. But then it is assumed that the easiest way for the victim to appease his captor would be to reveal the truth, when in fact that it is far easier instead to tell the captor what he wants to hear. Anyone with experience interrogating prisoners will soon realize that, if under enough pain, prisoners will say anything for the pain to stop. He would confess to any wrongdoing; name any names; reveal any diabolical scheme, so long as it would spell the end of his suffering. Information harvested from torture is unreliable at best and misleading far too often. With detainees unearthing any answer requested, it is very easy to find evidence to support even the most obscure and absurd policies. The Bush Administration should know all too well by now the disastrous consequences of this, as they used evidence extracted during the torture of Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi to formulate the argument that Saddam Hussein had links to Al Qaeda, which they trumpeted to the public to gain support for the war. It seems that now al-Libi’s testimony was just the torture talking; he later admitted that his testimony was false, and that he said it in order to avoid cruel treatment. President Bush only had to look so far as the Army field manual to realize that the “use of torture and other illegal methods is a poor technique that yields unreliable results… and induce the source to say what he thinks the interrogator wants to hear.” But the President is apparently so devoted to his beliefs that he will overlook any source that argues against his beliefs.

Now, America is reeling from the consequences of her President’s unwavering sentiment. The effort that the President put into making his beliefs reality has bred great internal turmoil for America. The torture taking place overseas has brought new life to the debates over the laws of war, the definition of torture, and the morality of such torture. These topics have become another set of ideological trenches that divide the American people. As debate rages over abortion, gay marriage, and stem cell research, among other things, does America really need another thing to divide her, particularly with an international terrorism conflict at her heels? Even more fiery debates have been ignited over the legality of torture. In his quest to make his beliefs reality, the President has pushed the law to the limit, and then some. He has weaseled his way through every logical roadblock by means of strict interpretation. He has looked at the wording of the law rather than the intent of the law. It is painful to watch America, supposedly the hearth of freedom and justice in this world, find excuses not only to torture, but to detain indefinitely with no practical means of challenging detention. While on his law-skirting ride, the President has brought the legitimacy of separation of powers into question by wielding power thought to be held by the courts and Congress (though, to be fair, Congress had been lulled by the Bush Administration into passing laws that augment executive power). The President has gone so far that he managed, without much of the public knowing it, to push a law through Congress, the Military Commissions Act (MCA), that strips us of our habeas corpus! How, one might ask, could this have possibly happened? One of the Act’s definitions of an enemy combatant is “a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006,” (that, by the way, makes it an ex post facto law, also unconstitutional) “has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense.” This definition specifies any person – not any alien or any foreigner -- meaning it applies to anyone, including US citizens! Our freedom is now at the whim of the President and the Secretary of Defense. Sure, it says one would be tried under a “competent tribunal.” Sure, the 4th US Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Administration could not detain someone under the MCA without trying them. But really, after all Bush has done to bend the law, are any of these legal safeguards safe? If the Constitution’s safeguards aren’t even good enough, how can these things be any guarantee of freedom? The Separation of Powers – that centuries-old statute that has long been one of the cornerstones of our Constitution – has been charred, and now habeas corpus, almost a millennia old, is now gone. And why? For interrogation techniques that don’t even work.

As our President continues to defend and implement such futile techniques, he darkens our image abroad. In his quest to insulate America from terrorism, the President chose to defy the Geneva Conventions while continuing to criticize other nations’ human rights abuses. Any chapter of history, and for that matter life, would show that hypocritical behavior is a surefire path towards illegitimacy, and current events would serve as yet another proof for this theorem. Until very recently, America was the champion of the human rights movement, which made its scathing criticisms of human rights offenders abroad carry significant weight. Now, however, it is too easy for countries like Russia and China, long two of the most prolific offenders, to condemn the techniques practiced behind the bars of Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere in rebuttal to our continual allegations against them. By resorting to torture, America has rendered herself illegitimate as a human rights proponent. Not only has this set the human rights movement back decades, but it has also opened a rift between America and her allies, even as they grow more disdainful of her in the wake of the Iraq debacle and other unilateral antiterrorism foreign policy measures. Our interrogation policy is one of a growing number of reasons that make it very costly for nations to associate with us due to our growing unpopularity throughout the world. Every minute we torture someone fills a day’s airtime for various propaganda machines worldwide, particularly those of Iran, Venezuela, and Al Qaeda. Indeed by torturing people held indefinitely, we infuse legitimacy into Al Qaeda’s demonization of us, and as a result increase their following. Would any one of us soon forgive someone who tortured a loved one or a friend? Do not expect the peoples of the Middle East to be any more forgiving. When an innocent detainee is released finally, scarred for life, he will not forgive us. He will not understand our motives or sympathize with us. He will live in bitterness of us, and perhaps may even become what he was imprisoned for. When an unemployed Muslim youth listens to an Al Qaeda broadcast, he will not forgive us. He will heed the words of Osama Bin Laden and believe them to be true due to our actions. At the very least, he will likely frown upon America; oftentimes, such a person will swell the ranks of Al Qaeda. When an insurgent contemplates how to treat a captured US Marine, he will not forgive us. He will play by the rules of war – the ones we have played by. In war it has always been an eye for an eye, and despite the unique nature of this conflict, this ancient idiom holds true. The worse America treats Guantanamo detainees, the worse insurgents will treat American military and citizens they capture.

President Bush instituted torture because he thought it would make America safer. In the end, only the intention turned out to be applaudable. Torture, morality aside, does not even work. Torture has divided America and annihilated our most fundamental legal safeguards. Torture has alienated our allies, emboldened our enemies, and endangered our servicemen abroad. Torture has been misjudgment at its worst. And yet, the consequences will continue to pile up, as President Bush just took a recent step in the wrong direction. Maybe as the consequences become clearer, he will finally see the errors of his ways and start moving in the right direction again. Or maybe he will be forever condemned to condemn America by implementing what he believes is effective, necessary policy. If that is the case, at least he has less than two years left. Then again, it is daunting to think of the harm that can be done in two short years, and even more foreboding to think of what happens if his successor continues his mishap. More likely, though, is that this torture policy will be cleaned out along with Iraq policy. The big question is this: by that time, just how much lasting damage will it have done?

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U.S. Policy Fanning the Flames Consuming the Palestinians

Last June, Hamas militants routed Fatah security forces in Gaza, causing Palestian President Mahmoud Abbas to dissolve the Palestinian Authority there. Now, the United States aims to bolster Abbas and Fatah in the West Bank, which would further a growing rift between the West Bank and Gaza. It is very tragic that it has come to this for the Palestinians, who may have let their last best chance of self-governance slip away. But it is unbearably frustrating that U.S. policy regarding the Palestinian Territories continues to augment the violence and the cynicism engulfing the Palestinian people.

Making Gaza and the West Bank separate entities will not stop the internal bloodshed nor will it make the Palestinians more moderate nor will it make Israel safer. Indeed, abandoning Gaza in light of Hamas’ coup would only strengthen the anti-West extremists there and could prolong the chaos there. An extremist chaotic environment is the perfect habitat for terrorist organizations, and, even worse, individual unaffiliated terrorists. At least when rockets rained down from Gaza before it was clear Hamas was the culprit. With freelance attacks, no one group can be held accountable. Such an environment could force Israel to stay centered around their military, which would stunt its development and undermine its already rocky relationships among other nations.

Splitting Gaza and the West Bank into separate entities would further complicate an already daunting diplomatic situation. Any negotiations of any sort would have to fit well with both Hamas and Fatah in Gaza and the West Bank, respectively. Granted it would not be the first time that Gaza and the West Bank were viewed differently, and it is true that the two regions are far from identical. But the Palestinians of the regions consider themselves, well, Palestinian, and the final goal they work towards is a single Palestinian state. However, if Hamas and Fatah become sovereign in their respective regions, which could likely result from the current U.S. policy, the Palestinians themselves may become divided as such into Hamas and Fatah Palestinians. Consequently, if a Hamas-led Gaza and a Fatah-led West Bank were to both take part in diplomacy, they would be working at cross-purposes, and they would work to shape any agreement hammered out into a form consistent with their distinct ideologies. Even if the Palestinians were not divided on Hamas and Fatah lines, they would be misrepresented by such ideologies in any negotiations.

The Bush administration has a more optimistic end in mind. They believe that if they support Fatah enough in the West Bank, then the Palestinians will see how much better a moderate government like Fatah is at governing than a radical Hamas one. This view may seem seductive, but only because it ignores history, particularly Fatah’s history, and takes an overly simplistic look at the problem.

When many Palestinians think of Fatah, they picture a gathering of corrupt, self-serving, and power-hungry individuals, and for good reason. Before the 2006 parliamentary elections, the Fatah-run Palestinian Authority did not perform many of the basic community services, such as garbage collection, that are taken for granted in Western countries. Indeed, Hamas’ landside victory in the 2006 parliamentary elections was not solely due to its radical ideology but also to the many community services it provided that the government neglected.

Fatah’s faults are only part of the problem, though. By trying to ensure Fatah’s supremacy in the West Bank, the administration is weakening the very democratic instincts they hope to build within the Palestinians. It is hard to be an active, democratic citizen if no matter what the ruling party will always remain in power. Would you vote, join political parties, or organize into interest groups if the Republicans were kept in power by an outside force forever? Putting an unpopular party in power is a surefire way to quell any democratic developments in a country. That is a lesson this country should have learned from the Cold War.

Ultimately the ball is in the Palestinian’s court, and the harsh reality may be that they blew their last reasonable chance at statehood. That does not mean, though, that U.S. policy cannot be a positive force to help unify the Palestinians around the task of building an independent, stable state. Unfortunately, current U.S. policy does just the opposite. It deepens the divisions that resulted in civil war last June, and it could serve as something the Palestinians could blame for their problems rather than something that could help the Palestinians solve their problems. Such policy could contribute to this generation of Palestinians shutting the door on any chance of a stable, unified Palestinian state.

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